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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In the first essay titled “The Value of Strategic Alliances in Acquisitions and IPOs,” I 
investigate how firms’ strategic alliance experience affects their valuations as acquisition targets or in 
IPOs. I propose that strategic alliance experience serves as a valuable signaling device for target and 
IPO firms, particularly those with more intangible assets and greater opacity. The results show that 
takeover targets with alliance experience receive higher premiums than those without such 
experience. More recent alliance experience as well as alliance experience in the same industry also 
contributes to a larger target gain. Similarly, IPO firms that have alliance experience are shown to 
obtain higher valuations than those without the experience. Finally, alliance experience increases the 
likelihood that private firms exit by going public rather than being acquired.  
In the second essay titled “For Better or For Worse: The Spillover Effect of Innovation 
Events on Alliance Partners,” I examine the spillover effects of breakthrough innovations on the 
strategic alliance partners of the innovative firm.  I find direct stock market evidence that the 
shareholders of strategic alliance partners significantly benefit from the spillover effects of these 
innovations. Multivariate analyses indicate that young and newly listed innovator firms with better 
growth opportunities generate bigger abnormal returns when announcing innovation events and 
bring larger spillover effects for their alliance partners with similar characteristics. In addition, I 
explore the risks associated with alliance partnerships, showing that FDA warning letters cause 
significant wealth losses for both the innovative firm and their alliance partners.  
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THE VALUE OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN ACQUISITIONS AND IPOS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The information asymmetry surrounding firms presents a valuation challenge to potential 
outside investors. This valuation challenge is particularly daunting for unlisted (private or subsidiary) 
firms. Faced with significant valuation difficulty, potential acquirers or IPO investors may discount 
the amount that they are willing to pay for the firm. For example, Officer (2007) notes that the 
premiums paid for unlisted targets are significantly lower than those paid for comparable public 
targets. While unlisted firms are generally more difficult to value, those that have a history of 
collaboration with other firms may have reduced levels of information asymmetry. In particular, the 
previous alliances that these firms have had with other firms can send positive signals about their 
value and reduce the asymmetric information problem for outside investors. According to a recent 
Wall Street Journal article, industry giants, such as General Mills and Procter & Gamble, are using 
their partnerships with a “crowdfunding” site to get to know more about certain start-ups and  
“...CircleUp’s partnerships with big conglomerates could be ‘a good thing for a business that’s 
looking to get acquired, eventually’...”1   
Indeed, several studies have shown that strategic alliances are common forms of 
collaboration that create value for the firms involved (e.g., Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin, 
                                                             
1  See “P&G, General Mills Tap Into Startups,” Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2013. According to this article, 
“…Cincinnati-based P&G said it offers the founders of startups listed on CircleUp mentoring as well as help setting up 
licensing deals or joint ventures. A P&G spokeswoman also confirmed that P&G may occasionally acquire a startup's 
business or technology.” 
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1997; Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov, 2013).  In examining alliances between biotech and 
pharmaceutical companies, Nicholson, Danzon, and McCullough (2005) find that the valuations of 
biotech firms increase after they have formed their first alliance, suggesting that the alliance sends a 
positive signal to investors. Furthermore, Ivanov and Lewis (2008) show that IPO firms with 
alliances obtain higher valuations on the day of the offering and also have more positive long-run 
return performance. Thus, if alliances increase the perceived value of a firm by alleviating the 
asymmetric information faced by outside investors, alliances may play an important role in 
influencing the valuation the firm receives as an acquisition target, and in the case of a private firm, 
in its exit via either a takeover or an IPO.  The exit outcomes of private, or more generally, unlisted 
firms are of particular interest because of the greater informational asymmetry surrounding these 
firms and, consequently, the greater benefit of strategic alliances as signals.   
Building on the literature, this paper examines the value of strategic alliances in mergers and 
acquisitions as well as in initial public offerings. I are interested in examining the signaling effects of 
alliances for not just public targets but also unlisted targets; the latter provide unique valuation 
challenges for potential acquirers because of their lack of publicly available information.  I also 
compare the value of alliance experience for firms with different levels of asymmetric information 
(i.e., unlisted, newly public, and more mature public targets) to explore the contingent effect of firm 
stages on the role of strategic alliances in acquisition premiums.  Moreover, I perform subsample 
analyses on different types of alliances, such as horizontal versus non-horizontal alliances, strategic 
alliances versus joint ventures, R&D alliances, and marketing alliances, since certain types of alliance 
partnerships may be more valuable than others. 
Using a sample of 29,089 completed acquisitions of public and unlisted targets announced 
during 1990-2010, our results show that the premiums paid for takeover targets with prior strategic 
alliance experience are significantly higher than those without such experience, especially for targets 
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that are unlisted. While strategic alliance experience increases the premium on average by 3.70% for 
public targets (7.98% for new IPO targets and 1.37% for mature public targets), the increase is 10.38% 
for unlisted targets. Alliance experience provides a stronger positive signal for unlisted firms and 
IPO targets because they have less publicly available information and hence are more difficult to 
value, consistent with signaling theory. Also consistent is our finding that alliance experience that is 
in the more recent past or that is in a related industry results in a higher premium, as the signal it 
provides is more timely or relevant.  
I next examine whether strategic alliances provide value for entrepreneurial firms that go 
public. Using a sample of 3,039 IPOs, I find that the valuation premiums for IPOs with alliance 
partners are 2.13 times higher than those without alliance partners. Furthermore, in examining how 
alliance experience influences the exit choice of private firms, I find that the firms with alliance 
relationships are more likely to exit via IPOs rather than being acquired by other firms.  Thus, 
strategic alliances appear to provide value to the sellers by alleviating the information asymmetry 
challenge faced by outside investors. 
The key contribution of our research is to show that firms’ alliance experience serves as a 
signaling device to reduce information asymmetry and increase their valuations. Indeed, alliance 
experience positively affects the willingness of acquirers or IPO investors to pay higher premiums 
for allied target or IPO firms. By exploring the more nuanced effects of specific types of alliance ties, 
the paper also advances our understanding of the various contingencies and boundary conditions of 
the role of strategic alliances in acquisitions and IPO valuations. This paper is also the first, to our 
knowledge, to combine comprehensive data on acquisitions, strategic alliances, and IPOs to examine 
the possible impact of alliance experience on entrepreneurial firms’ choices of exit.  
            The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and 
develops our hypotheses on the signaling role of strategic alliances. Section 3 describes the data 
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sample for mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances, and IPOs, as well as the dependent, 
independent, and control variables. Section 4 reports the univariate results and multivariate 
regression results that demonstrate the effects of alliance experience on target premiums. Section 5 
presents evidence on the beneficial role of strategic alliance experience on IPO valuations. Section 6 
examines the impact of alliance experience on the private firms’ choices of exit via IPOs or 
acquisitions. Section 7 concludes.   
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Researchers in finance have only recently begun to investigate the value implications of 
strategic alliances. Chan et al. (1997) examine the share price response to formation of strategic 
alliances and find positive stock price reactions and better subsequent operating performance for 
firms entering alliances. Allen and Phillips (2000) study corporate equity ownership and find that the 
largest increases in targets’ stock prices, investment, and profitability occur when block equity 
purchases are combined with strategic alliances or other product market relationships. Robinson 
(2008) develops and tests a model to address why firms sometimes prefer alliances over internally 
organized projects and shows that strategic alliances help to overcome managers’ incentive problems. 
Palia, Ravid, and Reisel (2008) analyze the motivation of internal project financing versus funding 
via outside alliances, and find that project risk is an important consideration. In a similar vein, 
Bodnaruk et al. (2013) argue that alliances help to improve firm operating flexibility and reduce 
agency costs related to free cash flows and capital allocation within the firm. Fang, Francis, Hasan, 
and Wang (2012) find that firms with alliance experience enjoy a lower cost of bank debt and are less 
likely to use collateral and covenants in their loan contracts.  
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Exploring the role of strategic alliances on IPO performance, Ivanov and Lewis (2008) 
examine 2,165 IPOs with positive EBITDA, including 280 IPOs with strategic alliance experience. 
Their findings show that IPO firms with alliance experience receive higher valuations on the 
offering day and exhibit better long-run returns, but these firms also have a higher degree of 
underpricing. Lindsey (2008) finds that strategic alliances improve the probability of exit by venture 
backed firms, via either IPOs or acquisitions. Furthermore, strategic alliances are shown by Ozmel, 
Robinson, and Stuart (2013) to serve as an alternative source of funding to venture capital for early 
stage high-tech firms. Relatedly, Reuer, Tong and Wu (2012) study the signaling role played by 
prominent venture capitalists, underwriters, and alliances in takeovers of IPO targets, and find that 
such associations increase the acquisition premium for the newly public firms.  
While the previous research provides useful evidence on the value of alliances, the literature 
has not addressed the role of alliances for unlisted targets which would likely benefit more from the 
signaling effect, given their general lack of publicly available information. Also unexamined is the 
contingent effect of various types of alliance partners as signals in acquisitions or IPOs, as well as 
the differential signaling value of alliance experience between the relatively more recent and distant 
past and between related and unrelated industries. Finally, it remains an open question whether 
strategic alliance experience influences private firms’ exit choice of IPO versus takeover.   
It is well recognized that participants in the takeover and capital markets possess different 
information sets. Thus, acquirers or IPO investors may face the “lemons” problem (Akerlof, 1970) 
when offering to buy or invest in another firm. A number of solutions have been suggested to 
alleviate this problem. In the so-called market solution, acquirers select targets that are publicly 
traded, which have much more publicly available information for correct valuation. Empirical 
evidence, however, widely documents that the acquisition of public firms often generates negative 
abnormal returns for the acquirers around the acquisition announcements (see Fuller, Netter, and 
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Stegemoller, 2002, among others). An alternative proposed in the literature is the ownership solution, 
in which the acquirer buys a certain equity stake of the target as “toehold” before bidding for the 
firm (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2009). Although toehold positions increase the odds of winning 
a bid for the toehold investors, studies have shown that the equity investments cause the toehold 
acquirer to bid more aggressively and end up overpaying in the acquisitions (“owner’s curse”).  A 
third way to mitigate the information asymmetry challenge is a contractual relationship between the 
acquirer and the target. For example, a contingent payment or earnout contract allows the acquirer 
to contingent certain payments on the target’s subsequent performance. Under the earnout contract, 
incumbent management of the target firm remains in place in the acquired firm, overseeing its 
operations and fulfilling the incomplete contracts (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Another important 
contractual relationship is a strategic alliance or a joint venture between the acquirer and the target 
before the acquisition. Empirical evidence on the acquisitions of prior alliance partners in the 
pharmaceutical industry indicates that alliances reduce the information asymmetry and the likelihood 
of overpayment by the acquirers (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). By focusing on the attempts of 
acquirers to mitigate the asymmetric information problem, however, the existing evidence sheds 
little light on the potential benefit of strategic alliances for acquisition targets.  
The information asymmetry problem is costly for high quality target firms as they would 
suffer from being “pooled” with low quality firms. Thus, as pointed out first by Spence (1973), the 
good may take certain actions to differentiate themselves from the bad. For high quality targets, 
particularly those having more opaque, less tangible, or harder-to-assess assets, strategic alliances 
may serve as a credible signal to convey their higher quality to potential acquirers (Reuer and Shen, 
2004). Strategic alliances typically involve some formal contractual agreements between the partners, 
which can be important reference points for acquirers. These contracts are legally binding, often 
involving a large amount of funding from more established partners to smaller partners, or the 
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licensing of some key innovative products from one partner to another. By providing an inter-
organizational endorsement, strategic alliances helps the involved targets differentiate themselves 
through various relational assets (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999). Given the potential certification 
or endorsement benefits provided by strategic alliances for the targets in reducing the asymmetric 
information and adverse selection discount, I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Strategic alliance experience of target firms serves as a valuable signal, resulting in higher 
premiums paid by acquiring firms. 
Strategic alliances are especially helpful for unlisted targets having little or no publicly 
available information, and for unlisted targets with intangible assets, the ability to signal their quality 
through external endorsements by alliance partners is even more valuable. The literature in alliance 
formation and partner selection has highlighted that one of the most fundamental drivers for firms 
to forge alliances with other firms is to reduce firm-specific uncertainty associated with R&D and 
boundary spanning activities that are mostly internal to the firm (Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips, 
2004; Gulati, Lavie, and Singh, 2009). Since acquisitions involve decision-making with incomplete 
knowledge and information, acquirers are most concerned about the firm-specific uncertainty and 
strive to mitigate this problem by looking for external signals such as strategic alliances. While 
uncertainty exists with or without information asymmetry, the term “firm-specific uncertainty” used 
here refers to all that results in the so-called “hard-to-value” phenomenon, including that arising 
from asymmetric information. I capture the relative degree of firm-specific uncertainty by several 
attributes of firms, such as privately held or publicly traded firms, newly or more mature public firms 
among public targets, and firms with more or less intangible resources (e.g., R&D development 
capabilities and high-tech intensive assets). To the extent that targets’ alliance partnerships help to 
mitigate firm-specific uncertainty associated with such attributes, I expect:  
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): The signaling effect of targets’ alliance experience is stronger when firm-specific uncertainty is 
greater in the acquisition process. 
The signaling value of alliance experience is likely to exhibit a temporal dynamic in that the 
signal conveyed by a more recent alliance experience would be more relevant and valuable to 
acquirers than one from a more distant past.  Consistent with this view, Gulati (1995) suggests that 
the likelihood of two firms entering a new alliance diminishes as the elapsed time increases since 
their last alliance. Research on organizational change also argues that, as organizations, firms tend to 
have short memories (e.g., Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993; Gulati, 1999). Similarly, strategic 
alliance experience has been shown to be helpful for R&D development, but the value of this 
experience depreciates over time (Sampson, 2005). The average age of the strategic alliances is also 
negatively associated with new product development (Rothaermel, 2001). Thus, I conjecture:  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The signaling effect of targets’ alliance experience decreases as the time duration between their 
alliance experience and the acquisition announcement increases. 
In the context of initial public offerings, scholars have examined the endorsement effect of 
strategic alliances in public offerings of new ventures in the biotechnology industry. For example, 
Stuart et al. (1999) find that biotechnology startup firms with ties to more established and prominent 
pharmaceutical companies go public faster and earn greater valuation at IPOs than firms without 
such ties.  In a paper on the contingent effects of inter-organizational partnership on IPO success, 
Gulati and Higgins (2003) highlight the moderating role of different equity market conditions on the 
signaling value of various ties for young biotechnology firms. Pollock and Gulati (2007) further find 
that pre-IPO alliances have a visibility enhancing effect on alliance formations for the firms after 
IPOs.  
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Clearly, private firms with strategic alliance partners are likely to have more resources 
available and more visibility than those with no alliances. 2  Their relationships with established 
partners can serve the role of certification as well as that of monitoring to reduce potential agency 
problems at the project level (Bodnaruk et al., 2013). A strategic alliance contract can also signal that 
the private firm has certain (perhaps intangible) assets that are valued by the established partners. 
Consistent with these predictions, Ivanov and Lewis (2008) find that alliance experience provides 
higher IPO valuations to “successful” firms, those with positive EBITDA.  I add to their work by 
examining a broader sample of not just profitable but also unprofitable IPO firms which may be at 
an earlier stage of growth. It is reasonable to expect that the signaling and certification role of 
strategic alliances would be at least as pronounced for unprofitable (and likely younger) IPOs.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): IPO firms with alliance experience are more likely to receive higher valuations than those without 
such experience. 
Although takeover is very profitable and is the more likely form of exit by an entrepreneurial 
firm, going public is generally viewed as an even more profitable and more successful mode of exit 
for the firm. Gompers and Lerner (2004) suggest that a new venture that goes public usually yields 
the highest return for its investors. In line with this view, Brau, Francis, and Kohers (2003) 
document that insiders of private firms who choose exit by IPO earn a 22% higher premium than 
those who sell out to acquirers (13.3 vs. 10.9, p-value < 0.1). Concerning the choice of exit via an 
IPO or an acquisition, Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008) find that firms with more growth 
opportunities, more capital constraints, and less information asymmetry (larger and VC-backed firms) 
are more likely to go public. In a theoretical analysis, Bayar and Chemmanur (2011) argue that the 
                                                             
2 In the context of biotechnology strategic alliances, Robinson and Stuart (2007) provide a good example for the 
certification role of large alliance partners in the IPO book building process: “…in the alliance between Bristol-Myers 
Squibb (BMS) and Cadus, BMS purchased a total of $20 million of Cadus equity in three separate transactions… Finally, 
at Cadus’s IPO in July 1996, BMS converted its B shares into 1.607 million common shares and purchased an additional 
$2.5 million worth of common shares in the IPO.” 
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IPO investors’ prior assessment of the private firm’s value, the private benefits of control to the 
firm’s insiders, and the degree of product market competition are important factors driving the firm 
to choose  an IPO exit.  
I extend this research by examining the impact of strategic alliance experience on the choice 
of private firms going public versus being acquired. Our thesis is that private firms with strategic 
alliances are more likely to go public because the signaling benefit provided by the alliances is more 
valuable to prospective IPO investors than to potential acquirers. A priori, public market investors 
are likely less informed than a potential acquirer about a private firm because of free riders and 
duplication costs in their information production. To the extent that an alliance sends a credible, 
public signal about the value of the private firm, it helps to mitigate such free-rider and duplication 
cost problems for public market investors. Thus, by reducing the information cost more for 
potential IPO investors than for acquirers, an alliance increases the relative attractiveness of the IPO 
choice.   
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The probability of going public versus being acquired is greater for private firms with alliance 
partners than for those without partners. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Alliances sample 
I use the Strategic Alliances and Joint Venture section of the Securities Data Company (SDC) 
database to obtain our original alliance sample. From that sample, I select all strategic alliances and 
joint ventures where both partners are U.S. firms. I match the alliance partners with the takeover 
and IPO samples described below, and obtain all targets and IPO firms that have alliance experience 
as well as those that do not have this experience. I only keep alliances that are within five years of 
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the acquisition announcements or IPOs, based on the previous research that suggests an estimated 
duration of about five years for strategic alliances (Chan et al., 1997).  
 
3.2. Takeover sample 
The takeover sample is obtained from the M&A section of the SDC Platinum database, with 
announcement dates between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2010. Bidders and targets are both 
U.S. firms. The acquirers are publicly listed, but the targets can be public or unlisted (private or 
subsidiary) firms. The acquisitions must be completed, and the acquirers must own more than 50% 
after the transaction. To be included in the sample, the transaction value reported in SDC must be 
over $1 million.3 The resulting sample consists of 4,767 public targets and 24,612 unlisted targets. 
Among the 4,767 public targets, 1,277 firms have alliance experience and the remaining 3,490 firms 
do not. Among the 24,612 unlisted targets, 986 targets have alliance experience while 23,626 targets 
do not. Following Song and Walking (2000), I define a horizontal takeover as one between a target 
and a bidder that share the same three-digit primary SIC code. Otherwise, the takeover is classified 
as being non-horizontal. By this criterion, 12,082 acquisitions are horizontal while 14,766 are non-
horizontal. 
 
3.3. IPO sample 
I collect our initial IPO sample from the SDC New Issues database. After eliminating 
closed-end funds, spin-offs, unit issues, real estate investment trusts, limited partnerships, financial 
firms (SIC 6000–6999), as well as offers that are priced at less than $5 per share, I obtain a total of 
3,093 IPOs. In this sample, 706 IPO firms have various numbers of strategic alliance partners while 
2,387 do not have any.  
                                                             
3 In robustness tests, I also use a $10 million transaction value cut-off and the main results do not change.  
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3.4. Variables 
3.4.1. Dependent variables 
The main dependent variable for the acquisition sample is the target premium, defined here 
as the transaction value to sales ratio (Premium), following Brau, Sutton and Hatch (2010) and 
Koeplin, Sarin, and Shapiro (2000).4  The transaction value is the amount paid for the target firm, 
and sales is defined as the target’s revenue in the year prior to the takeover announcement. 
Following Pollock, Chen, Jackson, and Hambrick (2010), I measure IPO valuation as the logarithm of 
the IPO firm’s market capitalization at the end of its first day of trading — the total number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by the first trading day’s closing share price.  I calculate the mean and 
the median valuation for our IPO sample.  For the logistic regression analysis on the choice of IPO 
versus acquisition, our dependent variable is an indicator variable which equals one if the private 
firm successfully goes public, and zero if otherwise.  For the hazard rate analysis of time to IPO and 
time to acquisition, the dependent variable is the hazard rate of an unlisted firm going public or 
being acquired in a given year after it is founded, where the firm’s founding date is from SDC 
VentureXpert database. 
3.4.2. Independent variables 
To capture previous alliance experience, I use allied target/IPO as an indicator variable which 
takes the value of one  if at least one alliance was formed between the target or IPO firm and 
another company within five years preceding the acquisition announcement or the IPO issue date, 
and  zero if otherwise. Total alliances is a categorical variable that measures the total number of 
                                                             
4 Financial statement data is largely unavailable for private firms.  Sales is the best available variable to use for the 
premium measure for two reasons: first, sales is the most widely available data item for our sample, and second, sales is 
generally less subject to manipulation than other income statement measures such as earnings. As a robustness check for 
the sample of public targets, I also use an alternative measure of premium: the percentage difference between purchase 
price and target valuation four weeks prior to the date of acquisition announcement in SDC database. The results are 
similar to those using our original measure of premium. 
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alliances a target firm has in the last five years, with 0 indicating no alliance in the time period, 1 
indicating one alliance partner, 2 indicting two to five alliance partners, and 3 indicating more than 
five partners. I create this variable to test whether more alliance experience impacts target premiums. 
I also use logarithms of the alliance count in IPO valuation regression as well as the analysis on the 
choice of IPO vs. acquisition.   
Previous research suggests that the signaling value of alliance partnership is contingent upon 
specific types of ties, or the actual content of information that flows across different network ties 
(e.g., Podolny and Baron, 1997; Uzzi, 1996; Gulati and Higgins, 2003). To investigate more in-depth 
the impact of various alliance relationships, I include as independent variables a number of variables 
related to the nature of alliances. Specifically, horizontal alliance is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the target or IPO firm shares the same three-digit SIC code as its alliance partner. This variable is 
used to test the hypothesis that alliances formed in the same industry send a stronger signal about 
the target or IPO firm’s quality. I also test the effects of other alliance characteristics, such as public 
versus private alliance partners, cross technology transfer agreements, research and development 
agreements, and manufacturing agreements. For targets with multiple alliance partners during the 
five years prior to acquisitions, the variable R&D alliance measures the percentage of the target or 
IPO firm’s research and development that is attributable to the agreement with the partners. 
Marketing agreement measures the percentage of joint sales and services, OEM, as well as valued-added 
resale agreements. Likewise, the percentage of supply collaboration between target or IPO firms and 
their alliance partners is captured by supply agreement, the frequency of funding relationships between 
the two is measured by funding agreement, and the frequency of technology or product market 
exploration collaboration agreements between them is measured by exploration agreement. In the 
takeover sample, I also control for cases in which the acquirer is a strategic alliance partner of its 
target. 
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High tech target/IPO is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if the target or IPO 
is from a high-tech industry, and zero if otherwise. This independent variable is used as a proxy for 
the level of firm-specific uncertainty in the acquisition or IPO process. The inherent risk associated 
with technological innovation makes the intangible assets of high-tech firms particularly difficult to 
value (see Kohers and Kohers, 2001; Benou, Gleason, and Madura, 2007).  Alliance duration (in days) 
is a continuous variable which measures the number of days between the target or IPO firm’s 
announcement of the alliance partnership and the acquisition announcement or the IPO issue date. 
For targets or IPOs with multiple alliance partners, this variable takes the average alliance duration 
of all these alliances. This variable is created to test the “duration” hypothesis, which proposes that 
the signaling value of an alliance relationship for an acquisition target or an IPO firm decreases as 
the duration of this relationship prior to the acquisition or IPO increases.  
3.4.3. Control variables 
Previous studies have shown more acquisition activities taking place when stock market 
valuations are high (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001). Similarly, IPOs experienced a hot 
market during the period of 1999 and 2000 (see Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter, 2008). Bubble period is an 
indicator variable which takes the value of one if the merger or IPO was announced during the stock 
market bubble period of 1999-2000, and is zero if otherwise. Private target is an indicator variable 
which equals one if an unlisted target is a private firm, and is zero if it is a subsidiary. Following 
previous merger studies, I use a horizontal merger indicator variable that is equal to one if the target 
and the acquirer have the same three-digit SIC code, and is zero if otherwise. Target size is the natural 
logarithm of the target’s total assets. To control for the influence of investment banks, I employ IB-
advisor as an indicator variable which equals one if the target hires an investment bank advisor, and is 
zero if none is hired. Similarly, I control for the impact of VC-backing by including the dummy 
variable for the target or IPO firm that is supported by venture capital. In addition, stock is a dummy 
15 
 
variable indicating that stock is the method of payment, and mix indicates the payment method by a 
mixture of cash and stock.  It is also important to control for targets’ growth opportunities since 
firms with better growth opportunities are possibly more attractive as alliance partners.  Thus, in a 
subsample analysis involving public targets, I control for targets’ Tobin’s Q within one year prior to 
being acquired. Tobin’s Q is calculated using the method proposed by Chung and Pruitt (1994).  In 
addition, I add analyst coverage of the targets during the year prior to acquisitions as another control 
for targets’ perceived quality, where the data on the number of analysts is from the Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S).  
For the IPO valuation regressions, I control for hot IPO market since prior research (e.g., 
Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003) has suggested that market conditions have an important 
impact on investors’ valuations of the firms that go public. The hot IPO market variable is 
constructed by calculating the monthly average change between the offer price and the closing bid 
price on the first day of aftermarket trading during 1990-2010, following Ritter (1984).  I also control 
for IPO proceeds, which is the total amount the IPO firm collects from the offering. Additionally, I 
control for underpricing, share overhang, and partial adjustment in the IPO valuation regressions because 
previous research has shown that first day return, share retention and partial adjustment are 
potentially associated with IPO market valuations (e.g., Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Bradley and 
Jordan, 2002). I create a dummy variable for top tier underwriters when the IPOs were taken public 
by an investment bank with a Carter-Manaster ranking of 8 or above on a 1-9 point scale, based on 
Carter and Manaster (1990) and the literature on the role of prestigious underwriters in IPOs. Given 
that our sample includes multiple industries, it is of interest to see whether certain high-tech 
industries fare better than others during the IPO process.  For this purpose, I include high-tech 
dummy variables, such as biotech, computer equipment, electronics, communications, and other high-tech, based 
on SDC special high-tech classification code, following Kohers and Kohers (2001).  
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On the likelihood of exit via IPO or acquisition, I add other control variables such as leverage, 
market return, industry return, industry market to book ratio (M/B), industry long-term debt to equity ratio, 
industry net profit margin, industry return on assets, and R&D intensity by three-digit SIC code.5 For the 
detailed descriptions of all these variables, see the Appendix 1.A: Variable Definitions.  
 
3.5. Empirical methods 
In the multivariate analysis, I use OLS regressions to investigate the factors that contribute 
to the variation in target premiums. The baseline model (1) in Table 1.3 is specified as follows:  
TARGET PREMIUM = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(ALLIED TARGET) + 𝛽2(PRIVATE TARGET) + 𝛽3(IB-ADVISOR) + 𝛽4 
(ALLIANCE DURATION) + 𝛽5 (STOCK) + 𝛽6 (MIX) + 𝛽7 (HORIZONTAL MERGER) + 𝛽8(TARGET SIZE) + 
𝛽9 (VC-BACKING) +  𝜀𝑖 .  
 
Similarly, I use OLS regressions to investigate the factors that contribute to the variation in 
IPO valuations.   The baseline model (1) in Table 1.5 is specified as follows:  
IPO VALUATION = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(ALLIED IPO) + 𝛽2(SHARE OVERHANG) + 𝛽3(OFFER PRICE) + 𝛽4 (ALLIANCE 
DURATION) + 𝛽5(UNDERPRICING) + 𝛽6(TOP TIER UNDERWRITER) + 𝛽7(PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT) + 𝛽8 
(HOT IPO MARKET) + 𝛽9 (LOG(PROCEEDS)) + 𝛽10 (VC-BACKING) + 𝛽11  (HIGH TECH DUMMIES) +  𝜀𝑖 .  
 
In investigating the choice of IPO versus acquisition, I use a logistic regression model to 
examine the determinants of the likelihood to go public or be acquired. The baseline model (1) in 
Table 1.6 is specified as follows, where Pi is the probability of going public: 
LOG (𝑃𝑖 1− 𝑃𝑖⁄ ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(ALLIED FIRM) + 𝛽2 (LEVERAGE) + 𝛽3(MARKET RETURN) + 𝛽4 (LOG(AGE)) + 
𝛽5 (INDUSTRY ROA) + 𝛽6 (INDUSTRY M/B)+ 𝛽7(INDUSTRY RETURN) + 𝛽8 (LOG(ASSETS)) + 𝛽9 (VC-
BACKING) + 𝛽10 (ALLIANCE DURATION) + 𝛽11 (OTHER CONTROLS) + 𝜀𝑖 .  
 
            As a robustness check for the analysis on the choice of IPO versus acquisition, I also fit a 
Cox proportional hazard model to examine the time to IPO versus time to acquisition.6  The model 
can be specified as: ℎ(𝑡,𝑿) = ℎ0(𝑡) exp(𝜷𝑿) . The Cox model states that the hazard rate of a 
                                                             
5 To control for the possible effect of outliers, all the industry level variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%.   
6 I also use a piecewise exponential hazard model to analyze the effect of alliances on the choice of IPO vs. acquisition. 
The results are similar to those that use the logistic and Cox proportional hazard models, and are available upon request.  
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particular event at time t  is the product of two quantities. The first of these, ℎ0(𝑡), is called the 
baseline hazard function. The second quantity is the exponential expression to the linear sum of 𝜷𝑿, 
which is over the j explanatory variables similar to those in the logistic model.  The baseline hazard 
function is an unspecified function, which makes the Cox model a semiparametric model and also 
can incorporate time-varying covariates (Cox and Oakes, 1984; Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005).  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON TARGET PREMIUMS 
 
4.1. Univariate results on target premiums 
In Panels A of Table 1.1, I report the descriptive statistics for the target sample and related 
deal characteristics. The deal characteristics show that targets with alliance experience more 
frequently hire investment bank advisors, have bigger deal value, and are acquired more in the form 
of horizontal mergers than targets without alliance experience. An examination of the sample firm 
characteristics shows that targets with alliance partners are more likely to be public firms, have 
greater total assets, have larger net sales, have higher Tobin’s Q, are covered by more analysts, are 
more likely to be in the high-tech industry, and have a higher probability of VC support.  
Panel B of Table 1.1 shows the alliance frequency distribution of 2,241 targets that have 
alliance partners in our sample. Similar to the definition of horizontal mergers, I define a horizontal 
alliance as one between two partners that share the same three-digit primary SIC code. The mean 
value for the frequency of horizontal alliance of all targets is 0.58, indicating that 58% of alliance 
partners are in the same industries as the target firms. Each target firm in this sample has, on average, 
2.5 alliance partners during the five years prior to the acquisition announcement. In addition, I 
present various characteristics of alliances, such as the mean value for frequency of public alliance 
partners involved (0.82), only private alliance partners involved (0.17), cross technology transfer 
18 
 
agreements (0.19), research and development agreements (0.24), and the average alliance duration 
before the acquisition (763 days). About 8.0% of the targets are acquired by their alliance partners. 
About 88.8% of the alliances are strategic alliances, while 11.2% of the inter-firm collaborations take 
the form of joint ventures.  
Table 1.2 compares the premiums for targets with and without alliance experience by the 
types of targets, the methods of payment, and the characteristics of alliance.  In Panel A of Table 1.2, 
for public targets, the overall mean (median) premium is 7.68 (2.21) if the targets have alliance 
experience but only 3.99 (1.87) if they do not.  The T test for the mean difference and the Kruskal-
Wallis test for the median difference indicate that the differences between the targets with and 
without alliance experience are statistically significant at the 1% level.  I further divide the public 
targets into IPO targets, those acquired within five years of going public, and mature public targets, 
those acquired after five years as a public firm. For IPO targets, the mean (median) premium is 
13.44 (3.78) for allied targets, and 5.45 (2.40) for non-allied targets. The differences between the IPO 
targets with and without alliance experience are also statistically significant at the 1% level.  For 
mature public targets, the premium difference between targets with and without alliance experience 
is much smaller, at 1.37, significant at the 10% level. Thus, younger, less mature IPO targets appear 
to benefit relatively more from alliance experience than more mature public targets, consistent with 
signaling theory. 
Also consistent with signaling theory are our findings that unlisted targets benefit more from 
alliance experience. For unlisted firms, the mean (median) premium is 16.72 (2.49) for allied targets, 
and 6.34 (1.10) for non-allied targets.  These differences in the mean and median premiums are 
significant at the 1% level.7 A further examination reveals that the results for unlisted targets are 
driven by private targets, which receive an average (median) premium of 21.11 (2.93) if they have 
                                                             
7 To control for the possible effect of outliers, the transaction value to sales ratio is winsorized at the 1% and 99%.   
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alliance experience, but only 7.04 (1.18) if they do not have any.  Alliance experience does not have 
the same positive influence for subsidiary targets.  The mean premiums for allied and unallied 
subsidiary targets are similar, while the median premium for non-allied subsidiaries (1.53) is 
significantly higher than that for allied subsidiary targets (0.94).  The signaling effect of alliance 
partnerships may be unimportant for a subsidiary target due to its link to the parent firm. The parent 
may also sell the subsidiary at a discount, for example, if it needs a large infusion of cash (Officer, 
2007).8  Another result in Panel A is that allied targets in horizontal mergers have higher premiums 
than non-allied counterpart, with both significant mean and median differences (p value= 0.01). 
Overall, the results provide preliminary support for our hypothesis that alliance experience enables 
targets, especially private targets, to receive higher premiums in acquisitions.  
Target premiums by the methods of payment follow a largely analogous pattern. For every 
method of payment, the mean (median) premium is significantly higher for unlisted targets with 
alliance experience than without the experience. The mean (median) difference in the premium for 
allied targets versus non-allied targets is 2.60 (0.88) in cash offers, 6.63 (0.73) in stock offers, and 
0.70 (0.85) in mixed offers. In general, cash offer premiums are less than stock offer premiums for 
both targets with and without alliance experience, consistent with Brau et al.’s (2003) argument that 
the seller’s risk decreases with a higher level of cash vis-à-vis stock payment.  
In Panel B of Table 1.2, I compare target premiums by the characteristics of the targets’ 
alliance partners. I compare alliances formed within one year of the acquisition announcement with 
those formed between one and two years (i.e., less than two years but more than one year), as well as 
those between two and five years, from the merger announcement. I find a large and significant 
difference (mean = 9.82, median = 0.46) in target premiums between the targets with the alliance 
                                                             
8 Since targets’ sales are the most widely available data for analysis of premiums (Brau et al., 2010), I use the transaction 
value to sales ratio (premium) as dependent variable in most of our analysis. As a robustness check, I also use offer price 
to book value of equity as dependent variable. The basic results remain unchanged and are available upon request.  
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duration measure of less than one year and those with the duration of one to two years. The 
premium difference is even larger (mean = 14.40, median = 0.88) between the duration of less than 
one year and that of two to five years. There is also a significant premium difference (mean = 4.56, 
median = 0.42) between the targets with the duration of one to two years and those with the 
duration of two to five years. These comparisons provide preliminary support for our duration 
hypothesis (H3) that alliances formed in the more distance past (i.e.., with a longer duration) are less 
valuable as signals for target quality. I also examine the public alliance partner effect, where the public 
status of targets’ alliance partners is defined as being public both as of the alliance announcement 
date (based on SDC alliance data) and as of the acquisition announcement date (based on 
Compustat and CRSP data).  Targets with public partners do tend to have higher premiums, 
especially for private targets, with a mean difference of 8.50 (p value = 0.01) compared to other 
targets with non-public alliance partners.  This result is consistent with Reuer et al.’s (2012) finding 
of a stronger signaling effect of more prominent alliances, those involving public alliance partners. 
Panel C of Table 1.2 investigates the effects of partner acquisitions and brokering. In a 
partner acquisition, the target is acquired by one of its previous alliance partners, while in a 
brokerage acquisition, the acquirer and the target share a common alliance partner.  A prior 
partnership between the acquirer and the target could reduce information asymmetry and hence the 
adverse selection problem (e.g., Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). A common alliance partner for the 
acquirer and the target could potentially also reduce information asymmetry via a brokering effect 
(e.g., Lindsey, 2008).  Among all allied targets, 113 targets are acquired by their alliance partners and 
have premium data available. Based on mean differences, partner acquisitions have a 2.85 higher 
premium than other allied targets, although not statistically significant. Based on median differences, 
partner acquisitions have a 0.23 higher premium (p value = 0.10). This suggests that targets acquired 
by their partners receive higher premiums, although not substantially so. The brokering effect is 
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more ambiguous, however, with brokerage acquisitions having a lower mean premium than other 
allied targets but a similar median premium. In any event, the effects of partner and brokerage 
acquisitions are not strong enough to subdue the signaling benefits of other alliance types.   
In a related test, I find that targets with horizontal alliance partners have higher premiums. 
In particular, targets that have horizontal alliances and are acquired in a horizontal acquisition 
(alliance-acquisition align) receive a substantially higher premium, with a statistically significant mean 
difference of 8.08 (p = 0.01) and a median difference of 1.05 (p = 0.01). The higher premium 
suggests that the intra-industry alliance experience of targets sends an important positive signal and 
is highly valued by acquirers in the same industry. Subsequent multivariate results confirm this 
interesting finding.  
 
4.2. OLS Regressions of the takeover premium 
   
In this section, I test our hypotheses in a multivariate framework using OLS regressions. The 
results are presented in Table 1.3. The sample excludes partner and brokerage acquisitions to ensure 
that the signaling effects of alliance partners are not confounded by such ties. I also include industry 
and year fixed effects to control for possible impacts of industry and time periods. The primary 
variable of interest in model 1 is the allied target dummy. The coefficient for this variable is positive 
and significant at the 1% level in model 1, thereby confirming our main hypothesis (H1) that alliance 
experience serves as a valuable signal. To further examine whether alliance experience is more 
valuable when information asymmetry is greater, model 1 includes an indicator variable private target 
as a proxy for asymmetric information, and model 2 includes an interaction term between private 
target and allied target. Both the indicator variables and the interaction term are positive and significant 
at the 1% level, providing support for our hypothesis (H2) that the targets’ alliance experience has a 
stronger signaling effect when the target exhibits more firm-specific uncertainty or opacity. All 
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models in this table also test the duration hypothesis (H3). The alliance duration variable is negative 
in all models and significant at the 1% level in most, supporting our hypothesis that more time-
distanced alliances are less valuable as a signal. This result is also consistent with Gualti’s (1995) 
finding on the temporal dynamics of prior alliance ties, and Sampson’s (2005) argument that the 
experience effect depreciates over time. 
In model 3 of Table 1.3, I use an alternative variable for targets with alliance experience. The 
coefficient for total alliances is 4.85 (p = 0.001), which is smaller than the coefficient of 15.74 (p = 
0.001) for the allied target variable in model 1. Thus, additional alliance partnerships do not matter 
much for a higher acquisition premium. So long as a target firm has the endorsement of one alliance 
partner, the discount effect on the target is substantially diminished. This result is consistent with the 
conclusion in the previous literature that the first alliance is the most important (Nicholson et al., 
2005) and that the marginal value of additional VCs is declining (Pollock et al., 2010).  
In models 4 through 11 of Table 1.3, I include variables related to certain characteristics of 
the alliances, to proxy for the informational content of network ties (Gulati and Higgins, 2003). In 
model 4, the main variable is horizontal alliance. The result shows that alliance experience in the same 
industry is valuable for enhancing the target premiums.  Model 5 adds the interaction term between 
horizontal alliances and horizontal mergers, alliance-acquisition align, which has a positive and 
significant coefficient of 5.24 (p = 0.01), in addition to the still highly significant and positive 
coefficient for allied target.  Thus, alliance experience in the same industry appears to be especially 
valuable for enhancing the target premiums in intra-industry acquisitions.  This finding provides 
further support for our main signaling hypothesis (H1) since alliance partnerships in the same 
industry are likely to send a more relevant signal to within-industry acquirers.  
Model 6 tests the interaction term between non-horizontal ally and diversifying acquisition, 
indicating that the target’s alliance partner(s) do not share the same 3-digit SIC code with the target 
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and the target is later acquired in a diversifying acquisition. The coefficient for this interaction term, 
non-horizontal ally*diversify, is positive (5.93) and significant (p = 0.01), suggesting that acquirers 
making diversifying acquisitions are willing to pay higher premiums for targets with alliance 
experience in a different industry. It is possible that these targets are more versatile, having broader 
experience that is of interest to the acquirers in their diversifying acquisitions. While this finding is 
consistent with Reuer et al.’s (2012) evidence that alliance experience is of a greater signaling value to 
targets in inter-industry acquisitions, I further identify the kind of alliance experience that is more 
valuable for targets in diversifying acquisitions. 
Model 7 of Table 1.3 tests the impact of strategic alliance and shows a positive and significant 
coefficient of 7.33 (p < 0.001), indicating the positive effect of strategic alliance relative to joint 
venture. Model 8 tests the effect of alliance partners that are public firms and shows that such 
alliances increase target premiums, with a coefficient of 2. 67 (p value = 0.05).9 Models 9 through 11 
test the effect of three other types of alliances: R&D alliance, licensing agreement, and 
manufacturing agreement. The results for these alliance types are generally insignificant, with the 
exception of the licensing agreement alliance.  The coefficient for licensing agreement is 3.89 and 
significant at the 0.01 level.  Recent research on the value of different types of alliance partnerships 
has shown that downstream alliances (or exploitation alliances such as manufacturing and marketing 
agreements) are more valuable for smaller firms (e.g., Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Katila, Rosenberger, 
and Eisenhardt, 2008; Yang, Zheng, and Zhao, 2013), whereas upstream alliances (or exploration 
alliances such as R&D alliances) are more valuable for larger firms (Yamakawa, Yang, and Lin, 2011). 
Since the sample for Table 1.3 includes all firms, large or small, the effects of different types of 
                                                             
9 I define an alliance partner as public if it is publicly listed both as of the alliance announcement date (based on SDC 
alliance data) and as of the acquisition announcement date (based on Compustat and CRSP data). As an alternative, I 
also defined public alliance partner based on SDC alliance data only to avoid any survivorship bias from using the 
Compustat and CRSP database.  While the alternative definition provides a higher number of alliance partners defined as 
public, the results using these two alternative definitions of public alliance partners are similar. 
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alliances are not obvious. The subsample analyses in Table 1.4 show a clearer picture of their 
differential effects.  In sum, the results in the models of Table 1.3 support the three hypotheses (H1, 
H2, and H3), indicating significant benefits of alliance experience in acquisitions. 
 
4.3. Subsample analysis and robustness checks 
 
In this section, I present the results from additional multivariate regression tests for the 
purpose of robustness checks. First, I separate our sample by public versus unlisted targets and test 
the impact of the main alliance variables on the premiums of these two types of targets. I further 
divide public targets into IPO targets and more mature targets.  Unlike public targets, I cannot 
control for certain firm-specific characteristics of unlisted targets (e.g., Tobin’s Q). Thus, following 
previous research such as Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1999), and Kohers 
and Kohers (2001), I use a matched sample method for unlisted targets to control for the potential 
endogeneity issue.  I match each allied unlisted target with, on average, five non-allied targets based 
on size (75% to 125% of the size of the allied unlisted target), industry (based on four-digit SIC 
code), VC-backing status, and time frame (in the vicinity of five years around the acquisition 
announcement of the allied unlisted target).  
Panels A through D in Table 1.4 report the results of the subsample analyses. Consistent 
with signaling theory, strategic alliances are more important for unlisted than public targets, and for 
IPO than mature public targets. Indeed, the coefficient for allied target is notably larger for the 
unlisted target subsample (33.87 in model 1 of Panel B) than for the public target subsample (4.98 in 
model 1 of Panel A), and also larger for the IPO target subsample (13.14 in model 1 of Panel C) 
than for the mature public target subsample (-1.89 in model 1 of Panel D).  The coefficients for VC-
backing and IB-advisor show largely a similar pattern. These results suggest that targets with less 
publicly available information, unlisted rather than public targets and IPO rather than more mature 
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targets, are in the greater need of endorsement from outside parties, and therefore, do benefit more 
from alliance partnerships.  Notably, for IPO targets, all the main alliance variables, such as allied 
targets, total alliances, horizontal alliances, strategic alliances, and public alliance partners, are 
positive and significant, while for mature public targets, only specific types of alliances, such as R&D 
alliances and licensing agreements, are positive and significant. For mature public firms, the 
coefficient for R&D alliance is positive and highly significant (4.52, p = 0.01), suggesting that for 
larger and more mature firms, upstream alliances such as R&D alliances are more valuable for 
potential acquirers. This type of alliance may send a stronger signal of growth possibly because large 
firms are less subject to the concerns of knowledge appropriation and alliance uncertainty. The 
result is consistent with the recent research suggesting that firm age has an important impact on 
firms’ alliance-formation choices and subsequent firm performance (Yamakawa et al., 2011).  
 
4.4. Additional analyses 
For additional robustness checks, I conduct a number of other empirical tests.10  First, to 
provide further evidence on the value of strategic alliances for high asymmetric information targets, 
I divide our sample by high-tech versus non-high-tech targets and run the regression models from 
Table 1.4.  For both the high tech and non-high tech subsamples, the coefficients for the target’s 
allied dummy (allied target) are positive and significant.  However, the coefficients for the alliance 
dummy and other alliance-related variables are larger for the high-tech than for the non-high-tech 
subsample. This difference suggests that alliance experience is more important for targets with 
greater firm-specific uncertainty, providing further support for our hypothesis (H2).   
Next, I examine an alternative explanation for the higher premium for targets with alliance 
experience.  When purchasing targets with alliance partners, the acquirer may gain knowledge about 
                                                             
10 For the sake of brevity, the results of these additional tests are not shown but are available upon request. 
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the R&D activities and technological pursuits of the partner firm.  Thus, the partner may try to 
discourage the target from agreeing to the takeover.  The acquirer may then have to pay a higher 
premium to entice the target to accept the deal.  To empirically examine this possibility, I analyze the 
market reaction for the (non-acquiring) alliance partners of all the targets in our sample.  If the 
acquirer was expected to gain a competitive advantage over the non-acquired partner, the partners’ 
market reaction around the merger announcement would be negative.  However, the results show 
that, around the acquisition announcement dates, targets’ alliance partners have positive returns on 
average, though statistically insignificant in general.  Furthermore, I run regression analyses using the 
abnormal returns for alliance partners as the dependent variable, along with other control variables 
such as an equity ownership dummy, a horizontal alliance indicator, the premium paid, method of 
payment, etc. The results show that the equity ownership dummy is positive but not significant in all 
models. This indicates that even for targets’ alliance partners with equity investment in the targets, 
there is no evidence of strategic information transfer from the acquisitions.  
 
5. VALUATION PREMIUMS FOR IPOS WITH AND WITHOUT STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCES 
 
This section examines the role of strategic alliances in the IPO process. Our hypothesis (H4) 
predicts that IPO firms with alliance experience receive higher valuations than those without such 
experience.  Our IPO valuation variable is the logarithm of the IPO’s market capitalization at the 
end of its first day of trading — the total number of its shares outstanding multiplied by the closing 
share price at the first trading day (Pollock et al., 2010).  
I examine the role of alliance partners on IPO valuations by OLS regressions of IPO 
valuations on main alliance variables and other control variables.  Column 1 of Table 1.5 presents 
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the results for baseline regression model of IPO valuations.  The main alliance indicator variable, 
allied IPO, has a positive and significant coefficient of 0.10 (with a p-value of 0.01). This indicates 
that IPOs with prior alliance experience gain significantly higher valuation in the public markets than 
IPOs without such experience, after controlling for other relevant factors. Alliance experience 
appears to send a positive signal to IPO investors, in addition to other indicators such as proceeds, 
offer price, and share overhang that are also significantly associated with IPO valuations. Notably, 
alliance experience has a greater coefficient than VC-backing and top tier underwriter (both with p 
value = 0.01). In column 2, I use an alternative alliance variable, the logarithm of one plus the total 
number of alliance partners, to capture the incremental effect of multiple alliance partners. 
Compared to the alliance experience indicator variable (allied IPO), the coefficient for log (total alliances) 
is 0.08 (p value =0.001), indicating that multiple alliance partners have little incremental effect on 
IPO valuation.  In columns 3 through 10, I test the impact of various types of alliance partners on 
IPO valuations.  Alliances in the same industry, strategic alliances, public alliances, as well as R&D 
alliances, all have positive impact on IPO valuation (columns 3, 4, 5, 8, and 10). The overall results 
in Table 1.5 support our hypothesis (H4) that alliance partnerships provide IPO firms with higher 
valuations in the public markets.  
 
6. THE EFFECT OF ALLIANCES ON THE CHOICE OF IPO VERSUS ACQUISITION 
 
In this section, I examine the role of alliance partners on the likelihood of exit by private 
firms via IPOs or acquisitions. Table 1.6 reports the results of the logistic regressions for the choice 
of IPO versus acquisition. The baseline model in column 1 tests the impact of the main independent 
variable, allied firm, on the choice of IPO versus acquisition. The positive and highly significant 
coefficient 2.43 (p-value = 0.001) indicates that private firms with alliance experience are more likely 
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to go public, instead of being acquired. Going public is generally viewed as a more successful and 
profitable form of exit by a private firm. By sending a positive signal to public market investors, 
alliance experience increases the probability that the private firm goes public. Furthermore, 
consistent with our duration hypothesis, the alliance duration variable has a negative and significant 
coefficient of -0.62, indicating that the impact of alliance experience on the decision to go public 
decreases as the duration increases.  The results for the control variables are consistent with the 
previous literature (e.g., Brau et al., 2003; Poulson and Stegemoller, 2008).  For example, private 
firms with VC backing are more likely to go public than to be acquired. Larger firms, higher 
log(assets), are more likely to go public, especially when the industry return is high. A higher industry 
market to book ratio (industry M/B), higher industry net profit margin (industry NPM), or higher 
R&D intensity (industry RDS) also positively predicts the propensity of going public by private firms. 
In column 2, the logarithm of the alliance count variable (log(Total alliances)) has a smaller coefficient 
(0.68, p value = 0.001) than the alliance experience indicator variable (allied target), indicating that the 
number of alliance partners do not have an incremental effect on the probability of going public.  
Columns 2 through 6 in Table 1.6 test the specific impact of various types of alliance 
partners on the choice of IPO versus acquisition. The results show that except for manufacturing 
agreements and supply agreements, all other types of alliance partnerships, including horizontal 
alliance, public alliance partner, strategic alliance, R&D alliance, licensing agreement, and marketing 
agreement, have positive and significant impacts on the probability of going public.  There is some 
evidence that certain types of alliances have more positive effects than others.  For example, 
strategic alliances have a much higher positive effect (1.84, p value = 0.001) than joint ventures on 
the likelihood of going public.  Private firms with public alliance partners are also more likely to go 
public.  Taken together, the results in this section support our hypothesis (H5) that private firms 
have a higher probability of going public if they have prior alliances than if they do not have any.  
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To ensure the robustness of this set of result on the choice of IPO vs. acquisitions, I also 
employ the method of event history analysis. I fit a Cox proportional hazard model, where the 
dependent variable is the hazard of a private firm going public in a given year after it is founded. I 
treat acquisition events as competing risks to avoid the loss of timing information. The firm’s 
founding date is from SDC VentureXpert database. Following the sampling procedure of Ozmel et 
al. (2013), I include only venture-backed firms in the tests to minimize the scope for heterogeneity in 
firm quality. The independent variables and control variables in these hazard models are similar to 
those in the logistical regression models in Table 1.6.   
Table 1.7 reports the Cox proportional hazard regression analyses regarding the effect of 
alliance partnerships on the time to IPO (hr_iva).  In model 1, I include only the alliance experience 
indicator variable, allied firm. The coefficient shows that alliances have a large positive effect (2.10, p 
value = 0.001) on the hazard rate of going public.11 After controlling for other variables as in model 
1 of Table VI, the effect is even greater. Thus, alliance experience appears to increase the speed of 
going public for firms in our sample, consistent with the results from the logistic regression models.   
All other covariates also have similar patterns to those in the logistic regression models. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Using a comprehensive sample that captures the strategic alliance experience of target and 
IPO firms during the period of 1990-2010, this paper shows that alliance experience enables target 
and IPO firms to obtain higher valuation premiums. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that 
strategic alliance experience serves as a credible signal for target and IPO firms.  Indeed, target and 
                                                             
11 The coefficients for hazard models have been transformed into hazard ratios, which give the percentage change in the 
hazard of going public with one-unit change in the corresponding covariates. The equation is as follows: hazard ratio = 
exp(β), where β is the original raw coefficients for the corresponding covariates. The similar transformation is employed 
in Ozmel et al. (2013), among others.  
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IPO firms with more intangible assets and greater firm-specific uncertainty appear to benefit more 
from the signaling effect. Alliance experience that is more recent or that is in the same industry also 
has a higher signaling value.  
This paper contributes to the literature by highlighting the importance of strategic alliances, 
particularly for firms that otherwise would face significant valuation challenges because of greater 
firm-specific uncertainty or information asymmetry. I shed new light on the determinants of target 
and IPO valuations, adding to the work of Officer (2007), Bargeron et al. (2008), Bauguess et al. 
(2009), and Gulati and Higgins (2003). While Officer (2007) points out that information asymmetry 
may explain part of the acquisition discount for unlisted targets, I emphasize the role of strategic 
alliances as signal in mitigating this asymmetric information discount.  Furthermore, our findings 
show that the signaling value of alliance relationships is contingent on the stages of the firm. For 
instance, the signaling value of alliance experience is greater for unlisted than public targets, and 
among public targets, it is greater for newly public than more mature targets.  The other findings of 
this paper suggest that the signaling value of alliances depends also on the types of partnership ties. 
For example, certain alliance contracts, such as R&D partnerships, can signal asset quality even for 
established firms.  
Concerning the role of alliances in private firms’ choice of going public versus being 
acquired, this paper provides evidence that alliances increase the relative likelihood that these firms 
choose to go public.  Since IPO is commonly viewed as a more successful form of exit by private 
firms, our results suggest that strategic alliances provide the additional benefit for private firms. In 
this context, this paper contributes to the emerging literature on exit choice (e.g., Brau et al., 2003) 
by demonstrating the importance of external ties in the decision to go public or be acquired.  
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics for Target Sample, 1990-2010 
This table describes our sample which consists of 29,089 acquisitions of public and unlisted targets 
announced during 1990-2010 in the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Merger and Acquisition database. All 
the variables for firm characteristics, methods of payment, and deal value are obtained from SDC.  Panel A 
and Panel B are descriptive statistics for acquisition deal characteristics and firm characteristics. Panel C 
describes the types of agreements between 2,241 targets and their partners. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1.A: Variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Deal Characteristics and Firm Characteristics 
  Non-allied target   Allied target   Differences in 
Variable  N Mean Median 
 
N Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
Deal characteristics         
Value of transaction (mil.) 26848 139.57 22.17 
 
2241 1635.82 138.23 
 
1496.25*** 116.06*** 
Equity value (mil.) 10600 216.38 30.47 
 
1693 2388.75 212.21 
 
2172.37*** 181.73*** 
Cash value (mil.) 20391 95.85 18 
 
1282 549.15 90 
 
453.3*** 72.00*** 
Stock value (mil.) 9793 143.44 16.25 
 
1281 2077.24 141.80 
 
1933.80*** 125.55*** 
Earnout value (mil.) 1509 20.13 4.852 
 
93 57.54 10 
 
37.41*** 5.15*** 
Horizontal merger 26848 0.45 0 
 
2241 0.53 1 
 
0.08*** 1*** 
Cash   26568 0.55 1 
 
2222 0.36 0 
 
-0.19*** -1*** 
Common 26568 0.21 0 
 
2222 0.37 0 
 
0.16*** 0*** 
Mix 26568 0.24 0 
 
2222 0.27 0 
 
0.03*** 0*** 
Premium 8597 5.52 1.33 
 
1602 9.70 2.25 
 
4.18*** 0.92*** 
Relative size 3603 0.45 0.172 
 
679 0.57 0.24 
 
0.12 0.07*** 
Earnout 26848 0.08 0 
 
2241 0.05 0 
 
-0.03*** 0*** 
IB-advisor 26848 0.32 0 
 
2241 0.72 1 
 
0.4*** 1*** 
Bubble 26848 0.13 0 
 
2241 0.20 0 
 
0.07*** 0*** 
Firm characteristics 
       Public target  26848 0.13 0 
 
2241 0.57 1 
 
0.44*** 1*** 
Subsidiary target  26848 0.33 0 
 
2241 0.10 0 
 
-0.23*** 0*** 
Private target 26848 0.55 1 
 
2241 0.34 0 
 
-0.21*** -1*** 
Target total assets (mil.) 6856 644.40 65.05 
 
1495 4937.88 147.60 
 
4293.48*** 82.55*** 
Acquirer total assets (mil.) 14843 5553.24 178.30 
 
1095 17405.04 203.80 
 
11851.80*** 25.50*** 
Target net assets (mil.) 6049 58.61 13.10 
 
1309 132.13 51.50 
 
73.52*** 38.40*** 
Acquirer size (log value) 14755 4.95 5.20 
 
1092 5.40 5.32 
 
0.45*** 0.12*** 
Target size (log value) 6821 3.98 4.19 
 
1493 5.08 5.00 
 
1.1*** 0.81*** 
Tobin’s Q 1104 0.98 0.59  815 1.83 1.06  0.85*** 0.47*** 
Analyst coverage 1104 1.59 1.61  815 1.98 1.95  0.39*** 0.34*** 
High tech target 26848 0.27 0 
 
2241 0.71 1 
 
0.44*** 1*** 
Tech bubble 26848 0.06 0 
 
2241 0.13 0 
 
0.07*** 0*** 
VC- backing 26848 0.07 0   2241 0.41 0   0.34*** 0*** 
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Panel B. Alliance Characteristics for Targets with Alliance Partners before Acquisitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables N Mean Min Std. Median Max 
Total alliances, 5 years 2241 2.468 1 3.554 1 71 
Alliance duration (in days)  2241 763.287 1 460.244 716 1825 
Partner acquisition 2241 0.080 0 0.278 0 1 
Brokerage acquisition 2241 0.065 0 0.247 0 1 
Alliance-acquisition align 2241 0.364 0 0.480 0 1 
Public alliance partner 2241 0.477 0 0.500 0 1 
Total alliances  2241 1.548 1 0.648 1 3 
Alliance duration 2240 2.259 1 0.812 2 3 
Public involved alliance  2241 0.823 0 0.382 1 1 
Private only  alliance  2241 0.171 0 0.377 0 1 
Subsidiary only alliance  2241 0.023 0 0.151 0 1 
Private involved alliance  2241 0.704 0 0.457 1 1 
Subsidiary involved alliance  2241 0.339 0 0.473 0 1 
Public only alliances  2241 0.383 0 0.486 0 1 
Horizontal alliances  2241 0.583 0 0.493 1 1 
Cross Tech Transfer 2241 0.188 0 0.391 0 1 
Licensing agreement  2241 0.271 0 0.445 0 1 
Manufacturing agreement 2241 0.149 0 0.357 0 1 
Marketing agreement 2241 0.411 0 0.492 0 1 
R&D alliance 2241 0.238 0 0.426 0 1 
Supply agreements  2241 0.044 0 0.205 0 1 
Exploration agreement  2241 0.014 0 0.119 0 1 
Funding agreement  2241 0.014 0 0.117 0 1 
Strategic alliance  2241 0.888 0 0.316 1 1 
Joint venture  2241 0.188 0 0.391 0 1 
JV only  2241 0.112 0 0.316 0 1 
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Table 1.2: Target Premiums by Target, Acquirer, Deal and Alliance Characteristics 
The target premiums are defined as the transaction value to sales ratio (Premium), following Brau et al. (2010). 
The transaction value is the amount paid for the target firms, and the sales value is the targets sales in the year 
prior to the takeover announcement. Allied targets include those that make at least one alliance in 5 years 
preceding the acquisition announcements. The unlisted targets include both private targets and subsidiary 
targets. Cash indicates that the acquisition is paid predominantly by cash; stock indicates that the acquisition is 
paid predominantly by stock; and mix indicates that the acquisition is paid by some combination of cash and 
stock. Target SDC high-tech industry classification is constructed using SDC special high-tech classification codes 
following Kohers and Kohers (2001). The public alliance partner is defined as being public both as of alliance 
announcement dates (based on SDC alliance data) and as of acquisition announcement dates (based on 
Compustat and CRSP data). Brokerage acquisition is defined as the common alliance partner shared by the 
acquirers and targets. All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.A: Variable definitions. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A.  Target premium by target, acquirers, and deal characteristics 
  Non-allied Targets   Allied Targets   Differences in 
 
N Mean Median 
 
N Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
All  8598 5.51 1.33 
 
1603 9.68 2.25 
 
4.17*** 0.92*** 
Public targets 3042 3.99 1.87 
 
1249 7.68 2.21 
 
3.70*** 0.34*** 
IPO targets 494 5.45 2.40  312 13.44 3.78  7.98*** 1.38*** 
Mature public targets 603 3.52 2.18  497 4.88 2.31  1.37* 0.13** 
Private targets 3998 7.04 1.18 
 
267 21.11 2.93 
 
14.07*** 1.74*** 
Subsidiary targets 1558 4.53 0.94 
 
87 3.25 1.53 
 
-1.28 0.59*** 
Unlisted targets 5556 6.34 1.10 
 
354 16.72 2.49 
 
10.38*** 1.40*** 
High-tech targets 2652 10.38 1.58  1155 11.83 2.74  1.45 1.16*** 
Non-High-tech targets 5946 3.33 1.24  448 4.14 1.40  0.81 0.16 
Horizontal-merger 4083 5.89 1.60 
 
876 12.39 2.63 
 
6.50*** 1.03*** 
Non-Horizontal-merger 4515 5.16 1.15 
 
727 6.42 1.91 
 
1.26 0.76*** 
           Method of payment N Mean Median 
 
N Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
Cash 3447 3.92 1.03 
 
496 6.52 1.91 
 
2.60*** 0.88*** 
Stock 2445 8.57 2.04 
 
643 15.20 2.77 
 
6.63*** 0.73*** 
Mixed 2632 4.78 1.23   451 5.48 2.08   0.70 0.85*** 
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Panel B.  Target premium by alliance duration and partner public status  
                                            (within allied targets)  
                                           
 
Alliance duration effects N Mean Median 
   (1) Targets w/ alliances within 1 year 330 19.9 2.85 
   (2) Targets w/ alliances within 1-2 years 425 10.1 2.39 
   (3) Targets w/ alliances within 2-5 years 846 5.53 1.97 
   Diff (1-2)   9.82*** 0.46** 
   Diff (2-3) 
 
4.56*** 0.42*** 
   Diff (1-3)   14.40*** 0.88*** 
   Public alliance partner effect N Mean Median 
   (1) Targets w/ other partners 806 9.91 2.07 
   (2) Targets w/ public partners 797 9.45 2.44 
   Diff (2-1)   -0.47 0.36** 
     N Mean Median 
   (1) Public targets with other partners 609 6.87 2.00 
   (2) Public targets with public partners 640 8.46 2.39 
   Diff (2-1)   1.60 0.39** 
     N Mean Median 
   (1) Other targets with other partners 1491 9.09 2.21 
   (2) Private targets with public partners 112 17.59 3.41 
   Diff (2-1)   8.50*** 1.20*** 
     N Mean Median 
   (1) Subsidiary targets with other partners 42 3.36 1.54 
   (2) Subsidiary targets with public partners 45 3.16 1.53 
   Diff (2-1)   -0.20 -0.01 
    
Panel C.  Target premium by acquirer, target and partner relationships  
                                       (within allied targets) 
 
Partner acquisition effect N Mean Median 
   (1) Non-partner acquisition 1490 9.48 2.23 
   (2) Partner acquisition 113 12.33 2.46 
   Diff (2-1)   2.85 0.23* 
   Brokerage acquisition effect N Mean Median 
   (1) Acquirer & target do not share partners 1483 9.91 2.22 
   (2) Acquirer & target share partners 120 6.83 2.66 
   Diff (2-1) 
 
-3.08* 0.45 
   Alliance alignment effect N Mean Median 
   Non-horizontal alliances 659 6.70 1.87 
   Horizontal alliances 944 11.76 2.60 
   Diff (2-1)   5.05*** 0.74*** 
   Alliance-acquisition align N Mean Median 
   Alliance-acquisition non-align 1007 6.67 1.92 
   Alliance-acquisition align 596 14.76 2.98 
   Diff (2-1)   8.08*** 1.05*** 
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Table 1.3: OLS Regressions of Target Premiums  
The dependent variable is the ratio of the transaction value to the sales value (Premium). The sample includes all targets, 
except for partner acquisitions and brokerage acquisitions. Partner acquisition is defined as the acquisitions where acquirers 
acquire targets who were the acquirers’ alliance partner prior to the acquisitions. Brokerage acquisition is defined as the 
acquisitions where acquirers and targets share common alliance partner. Allied target is an indicator variable which takes 
the value one if at least one alliance has been made between the target and another company in 5 years preceding the 
acquisition announcement, and zero otherwise. The public alliance partner is defined as alliance partners being public as of 
alliance announcement dates based on SDC alliance data) and as of acquisition announcement dates (based on 
Compustat and CRSP data). Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 12 industry classifications. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1.A: Variable definitions. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Variables premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium 
            
Alliance duration -6.12*** -5.76*** -3.20*** -1.67*** -6.18*** -6.16*** -2.63*** -0.84** -0.45 -0.80** -0.52 
 (-7.17) (-6.72) (-5.06) (-3.83) (-7.23) (-7.19) (-4.45) (-2.05) (-1.19) (-2.11) (-1.43) 
VC-backing 3.95*** 3.95*** 3.88*** 4.22*** 3.96*** 3.97*** 3.88*** 4.11*** 4.19*** 4.08*** 4.22*** 
 (4.66) (4.67) (4.56) (4.98) (4.68) (4.69) (4.56) (4.83) (4.93) (4.80) (4.96) 
Private target 2.14*** 1.35* 2.03*** 2.07*** 2.20*** 2.20*** 2.09*** 2.01*** 2.03*** 2.04*** 2.02*** 
 (2.80) (1.72) (2.66) (2.71) (2.88) (2.89) (2.73) (2.62) (2.64) (2.66) (2.64) 
Stock 6.13*** 6.11*** 6.24*** 6.27*** 6.12*** 6.14*** 6.30*** 6.37*** 6.37*** 6.35*** 6.37*** 
 (8.33) (8.30) (8.46) (8.50) (8.32) (8.35) (8.54) (8.62) (8.62) (8.60) (8.63) 
Mix 0.98 0.92 1.08 1.08 0.96 1.00 1.21* 1.14 1.11 1.13 1.10 
 (1.33) (1.26) (1.47) (1.47) (1.31) (1.36) (1.65) (1.56) (1.52) (1.54) (1.50) 
Target size -2.04*** -2.00*** -2.09*** -2.00*** -2.02*** -2.00*** -1.98*** -2.00*** -1.98*** -1.98*** -1.99*** 
 (-11.29) (-11.05) (-11.46) (-11.03) (-11.17) (-11.03) (-10.96) (-11.02) (-10.92) (-10.93) (-10.96) 
IB-Advisor 2.88*** 2.83*** 3.09*** 3.06*** 2.87*** 2.88*** 3.00*** 3.08*** 3.10*** 3.08*** 3.10*** 
 (3.67) (3.61) (3.93) (3.89) (3.66) (3.68) (3.81) (3.92) (3.94) (3.91) (3.93) 
Horizontal merger 0.77 0.72 0.79 0.58 0.17  0.76 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.72 
 (1.32) (1.24) (1.36) (1.00) (0.28)  (1.30) (1.21) (1.22) (1.19) (1.23) 
Allied target 15.74*** 13.51***   13.71*** 13.56***      
 (7.33) (6.14)   (6.14) (6.07)      
Allied*private  10.73***          
  (4.63)          
Total alliances    4.85***         
   (5.30)         
Horizontal alliance    6.33*** 0.80       
    (4.78) (0.44)       
Alliance-acquisition align     5.24***       
     (2.71)       
Non-horizontal-ally      -5.47***      
      (-3.72)      
Diversifying      -5.18**      
      (-2.44)      
Non-horizontal-ally*diversify      5.93***      
      (2.63)      
Strategic alliance        7.33***     
       (4.67)     
Public alliance partner        2.67**    
        (2.04)    
R&D alliance         0.68   
         (0.41)   
Licensing agreement           3.89***  
          (2.58)  
Manufacturing agreement           2.17 
           (1.19) 
Constant 4.39 4.31 4.43 4.13 4.48 9.73 4.08 4.11 4.03 4.06 4.05 
 (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.35) (0.38) (0.83) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) 
            
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,100 7,100 7,100 7,100 7,100 7,100 7,100 7,100 7,100 7,100 7,100 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
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Table 1.4: Subsample Analyses for Public and Unlisted Targets 
The dependent variable is the ratio of the transaction value to the sales value (Premium). Partner acquisitions and brokerage 
acquisitions are excluded from all the subsamples in this table. Models in Panel A include only the subsample of publicly 
traded targets. Models in Panel B include only unlisted (i.e., private and subsidiary) targets. Models in Panel C include only IPO 
targets defined as those being acquired within five years after publicly listed based on Compustat and CRSP database. 
Models in Panel D include mature public targets defined as those being acquired after publicly listed for more than five 
years. Tobin’s Q is calculated following Chung and Pruitt (1994). Analyst coverage is the logarithm of one plus the 
number of analysts covering the targets within one year prior to the acquisitions. Industry fixed effects are based on 
Fama-French 12 industry classifications. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A.  Public Targets  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium 
          
Alliance duration -1.94** -1.92*** -0.75* -0.95 -0.59 -0.45 -0.53 -0.31 -0.25 
 (-2.26) (-3.00) (-1.68) (-1.62) (-1.38) (-1.12) (-1.30) (-0.80) (-0.56) 
VC-backing -0.45 -0.61 -0.33 -0.50 -0.51 -0.43 -0.48 -0.45 -0.41 
 (-0.45) (-0.61) (-0.33) (-0.50) (-0.51) (-0.42) (-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.40) 
Tobin’s Q 5.46*** 5.42*** 5.49*** 5.48*** 5.51*** 5.54*** 5.50*** 5.54*** 5.54*** 
 (18.80) (18.68) (19.02) (18.82) (19.07) (19.22) (19.03) (19.21) (19.20) 
Analyst Coverage -1.32* -1.35* -1.33* -1.27* -1.24* -1.26* -1.24* -1.25* -1.25* 
 (-1.81) (-1.86) (-1.82) (-1.74) (-1.70) (-1.73) (-1.70) (-1.71) (-1.72) 
Stock 0.48 0.49 0.39 0.56 0.59 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.56 
 (0.43) (0.44) (0.35) (0.50) (0.52) (0.44) (0.48) (0.51) (0.50) 
Mix -1.15 -1.10 -1.21 -1.00 -1.04 -1.08 -1.03 -1.08 -1.10 
 (-0.96) (-0.92) (-1.01) (-0.84) (-0.87) (-0.90) (-0.86) (-0.90) (-0.91) 
Target size -0.05 -0.16 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 
 (-0.15) (-0.43) (-0.04) (-0.10) (-0.24) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.09) 
Horizontal merger 2.64*** 2.74*** 2.51*** 2.64*** 2.57*** 2.61*** 2.60*** 2.62*** 2.60*** 
 (3.14) (3.26) (2.97) (3.13) (3.05) (3.10) (3.09) (3.11) (3.09) 
IB-Advisor 2.98 2.90 2.90 3.03 2.85 2.98 2.92 3.04 3.01 
 (1.34) (1.31) (1.31) (1.36) (1.28) (1.34) (1.31) (1.36) (1.35) 
Allied target 4.98**         
 (2.23)         
Total alliances   3.00***        
  (3.27)        
Horizontal alliance   2.96**       
   (2.19)       
Strategic alliance     2.58      
    (1.63)      
Public alliance partner     2.36*     
     (1.81)     
R&D alliance      2.58    
      (1.62)    
Licensing agreement        2.95**   
       (1.97)   
Cross tech transfer        1.45  
        (0.83)  
Marketing agreement         0.17 
         (0.13) 
Constant -3.01 -1.95 -3.10 -3.60 -2.48 -2.97 -2.85 -3.32 -3.49 
 (-0.39) (-0.25) (-0.40) (-0.46) (-0.32) (-0.38) (-0.36) (-0.42) (-0.45) 
          
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 1,777 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
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Panel B.  Unlisted Targets  
The allied unlisted targets sample and non-allied unlisted targets control group are formed using the matched-sample 
method. For each allied unlisted target, I match it with on average around five non-allied targets based on size (75% to 
125% of the size of the allied unlisted targets), industry (based on four-digit SIC code), VC-backing status, high-tech 
status, and in the vicinity of 5 years around the acquisition announcement of allied unlisted target. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Variables premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium 
            
Alliance duration -13.77*** -13.97*** -6.45** -3.41* -7.33** -1.36 -0.43 -0.76 -0.24 -0.62 -0.45 
 (-3.89) (-3.95) (-2.43) (-1.70) (-2.44) (-0.76) (-0.28) (-0.48) (-0.15) (-0.41) (-0.26) 
VC-backing 9.29*** 9.48*** 9.18*** 9.84*** 9.02*** 9.22*** 9.30*** 9.21*** 9.45*** 9.28*** 9.29*** 
 (2.73) (2.79) (2.68) (2.86) (2.63) (2.68) (2.70) (2.67) (2.74) (2.69) (2.70) 
Stock 12.40*** 12.47*** 13.09*** 13.69*** 12.93*** 13.37*** 13.66*** 13.58*** 13.74*** 13.58*** 13.60*** 
 (3.33) (3.35) (3.50) (3.65) (3.45) (3.55) (3.63) (3.61) (3.65) (3.62) (3.62) 
Mix 0.39 0.37 0.96 1.23 0.90 1.08 1.01 1.04 1.04 1.08 1.07 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.31) (0.40) (0.29) (0.35) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) 
Target size -1.96** -1.99** -2.30** -2.16** -1.85* -2.14** -2.12** -2.11** -2.17** -2.11** -2.11** 
 (-2.00) (-2.04) (-2.34) (-2.19) (-1.87) (-2.17) (-2.15) (-2.14) (-2.19) (-2.14) (-2.14) 
IB-advisor 1.36 1.42 2.46 2.71 1.92 2.64 2.68 2.67 2.76 2.63 2.65 
 (0.46) (0.48) (0.83) (0.91) (0.64) (0.88) (0.89) (0.89) (0.92) (0.88) (0.88) 
Horizontal merger 2.34  2.53 1.99 2.08 2.54 2.47 2.47 2.52 2.48 2.46 
 (0.86)  (0.92) (0.72) (0.76) (0.92) (0.90) (0.90) (0.92) (0.90) (0.90) 
Allied target 33.87*** 36.25***          
 (4.08) (4.20)          
Allied*diversifying  -6.33          
  (-0.89)          
Diversifying  -1.21          
  (-0.36)          
Total alliances   10.23***         
   (2.63)         
Horizontal alliance    11.74**        
    (2.04)        
Strategic alliance     18.61**       
     (2.55)       
Public alliance partner      4.03      
      (0.73)      
R&D alliance       -2.68     
       (-0.33)     
Licensing agreement        1.81    
        (0.24)    
Cross tech transfer         -5.09   
         (-0.68)   
Manufacturing agreement          0.30  
          (0.03)  
Marketing agreement           -0.96 
           (-0.16) 
Constant 12.74 14.73 13.01 12.14 13.15 12.00 11.50 11.35 11.18 11.27 11.12 
 (0.94) (1.08) (0.95) (0.89) (0.96) (0.88) (0.84) (0.83) (0.82) (0.82) (0.81) 
            
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
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Panel C.  IPO Targets  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium 
          
Alliance duration -5.66*** -3.79*** -1.90* -3.53*** -1.63* -0.90 -0.77 -0.91 -0.92 
 (-3.40) (-2.81) (-1.86) (-2.71) (-1.74) (-0.98) (-0.85) (-1.01) (-0.96) 
VC-backing -0.12 -0.25 0.00 -0.30 -0.42 -0.09 -0.62 -0.08 -0.51 
 (-0.06) (-0.13) (0.00) (-0.16) (-0.21) (-0.05) (-0.32) (-0.04) (-0.27) 
Tobin’s Q 5.32*** 5.34*** 5.50*** 5.36*** 5.52*** 5.58*** 5.55*** 5.57*** 5.57*** 
 (11.15) (11.13) (11.56) (11.19) (11.61) (11.74) (11.82) (11.71) (11.92) 
Analyst Coverage -2.68* -2.50* -2.64* -2.60* -2.47* -2.61* -2.60* -2.62* -2.69* 
 (-1.81) (-1.68) (-1.77) (-1.75) (-1.65) (-1.74) (-1.77) (-1.75) (-1.83) 
Stock -0.22 -0.14 -0.12 -0.02 0.27 0.16 0.83 0.17 0.74 
 (-0.10) (-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.01) (0.12) (0.07) (0.39) (0.08) (0.35) 
Mix -4.36* -3.87 -4.23* -3.45 -3.62 -3.87 -2.12 -3.87 -2.16 
 (-1.73) (-1.54) (-1.67) (-1.37) (-1.43) (-1.53) (-0.85) (-1.53) (-0.86) 
Target size 0.20 0.07 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.32 
 (0.26) (0.09) (0.35) (0.31) (0.30) (0.40) (0.47) (0.39) (0.41) 
Horizontal merger 3.27* 3.10* 2.93* 3.09* 2.93* 3.14* 3.16* 3.14* 3.17* 
 (1.87) (1.77) (1.66) (1.77) (1.66) (1.79) (1.83) (1.78) (1.84) 
IB-Advisor 4.48 4.48 4.68 4.65 4.39 4.79 4.28 4.83 4.39 
 (1.12) (1.12) (1.17) (1.16) (1.09) (1.19) (1.10) (1.20) (1.13) 
Allied target 13.14***         
 (3.34)         
Total alliances   4.55***        
  (2.77)        
Horizontal alliance   4.85*       
   (1.78)       
Strategic alliance     8.61***      
    (2.67)      
Public alliance partner     4.67*     
     (1.79)     
R&D alliance      0.57    
      (0.18)    
Licensing agreement        2.66   
       (0.90)   
Cross tech transfer        0.76  
        (0.23)  
Marketing agreement         2.87 
         (1.03) 
Constant -0.99 0.96 -0.95 -2.94 -1.43 -3.42 -4.43 -3.39 -3.79 
 (-0.06) (0.06) (-0.06) (-0.18) (-0.09) (-0.21) (-0.28) (-0.21) (-0.24) 
          
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 797 797 797 797 797 797 778 797 778 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
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Panel D. Mature Public Targets  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium premium 
          
Alliance duration 0.76 -0.58 -0.20 0.39 -0.08 -0.19 -0.23 0.03 0.34 
 (0.77) (-0.83) (-0.45) (0.63) (-0.17) (-0.47) (-0.54) (0.06) (0.74) 
VC-backing -0.54 -0.64 -0.46 -0.50 -0.55 -0.54 -0.66 -0.61 -0.46 
 (-0.46) (-0.54) (-0.39) (-0.42) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.56) (-0.52) (-0.39) 
Tobin’s Q 5.24*** 5.20*** 5.20*** 5.24*** 5.19*** 5.18*** 5.16*** 5.22*** 5.22*** 
 (13.20) (13.13) (13.15) (13.18) (13.08) (13.14) (13.06) (13.21) (13.19) 
Analyst Coverage -0.20 -0.33 -0.33 -0.21 -0.24 -0.32 -0.25 -0.22 -0.22 
 (-0.26) (-0.42) (-0.41) (-0.27) (-0.30) (-0.40) (-0.31) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
Stock -0.29 -0.23 -0.44 -0.33 -0.27 -0.45 -0.25 -0.26 -0.25 
 (-0.22) (-0.18) (-0.34) (-0.25) (-0.21) (-0.35) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.19) 
Mix -1.41 -1.40 -1.45 -1.45 -1.37 -1.39 -1.35 -1.37 -1.35 
 (-1.11) (-1.11) (-1.15) (-1.14) (-1.08) (-1.10) (-1.07) (-1.08) (-1.06) 
Target size -0.26 -0.33 -0.25 -0.27 -0.30 -0.32 -0.33 -0.31 -0.26 
 (-0.63) (-0.79) (-0.59) (-0.66) (-0.73) (-0.77) (-0.81) (-0.74) (-0.63) 
Horizontal merger 2.12** 2.23** 2.07** 2.11** 2.13** 2.13** 2.16** 2.16** 2.12** 
 (2.38) (2.50) (2.32) (2.37) (2.39) (2.39) (2.43) (2.42) (2.37) 
IB-Advisor 1.68 1.64 1.70 1.68 1.64 1.89 1.52 1.65 1.57 
 (0.59) (0.58) (0.60) (0.59) (0.57) (0.67) (0.53) (0.58) (0.55) 
Allied target -1.89         
 (-0.71)         
Total alliances   1.33        
  (1.23)        
Horizontal alliance   2.12       
   (1.46)       
Strategic alliance     -0.97      
    (-0.56)      
Public alliance partner     1.31     
     (0.95)     
R&D alliance      4.52***    
      (2.70)    
Licensing agreement        3.87**   
       (2.44)   
Cross tech transfer        1.84  
        (1.01)  
Marketing agreement         -1.34 
         (-0.94) 
Constant -1.74 -1.16 -1.86 -1.52 -1.08 -0.89 -0.59 -1.26 -1.36 
 (-0.22) (-0.14) (-0.23) (-0.19) (-0.13) (-0.11) (-0.07) (-0.16) (-0.17) 
          
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,019 1,019 1,019 1,019 1,019 1,019 1,019 1,019 1,019 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
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Table 1.5: IPO Valuation Regressions 
 
The dependent variable, Log(IPO market cap.) or imcapd, is the logarithm of the IPO’s market capitalization at the end of 
its first day trading. All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.A: Variable definitions. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables imcapd imcapd imcapd imcapd imcapd imcapd imcapd imcapd imcapd imcapd 
           
VC-backing 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (3.69) (3.79) (3.91) (3.76) (3.89) (3.99) (4.02) (3.98) (4.03) (4.03) 
Offer price 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (2.83) (2.85) (2.77) (2.88) (2.66) (2.74) (2.79) (2.81) (2.75) (2.76) 
Log (proceeds) 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 
 (81.68) (81.69) (81.89) (81.95) (81.88) (81.90) (81.87) (81.83) (81.83) (81.89) 
Share overhang 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
 (68.93) (68.79) (68.91) (68.92) (69.08) (69.08) (69.17) (69.21) (69.18) (69.16) 
Alliance duration -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01* 0.02** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.02** 
 (-1.14) (-0.59) (1.53) (-0.72) (1.71) (2.07) (2.64) (2.40) (3.20) (2.10) 
Underpricing 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (15.84) (15.82) (15.81) (15.80) (15.87) (15.96) (15.93) (15.91) (15.95) (15.96) 
Partial adjustment 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 
 (11.46) (11.40) (11.51) (11.38) (11.51) (11.60) (11.49) (11.55) (11.57) (11.44) 
Top tier underwriter 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (3.72) (3.68) (3.73) (3.61) (3.73) (3.69) (3.71) (3.74) (3.77) (3.69) 
Market return 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 
 (0.35) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.41) (0.44) (0.36) (0.42) (0.38) (0.40) 
Log (Age) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-1.27) (-1.32) (-1.45) (-1.30) (-1.48) (-1.50) (-1.52) (-1.47) (-1.52) (-1.51) 
Hot IPO market 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (3.22) (3.29) (3.31) (3.29) (3.33) (3.29) (3.32) (3.36) (3.32) (3.31) 
Biotech 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (1.07) (1.21) (1.43) (1.17) (1.34) (0.94) (1.47) (1.29) (1.48) (1.38) 
Computer equipment 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (4.62) (4.45) (4.74) (4.29) (4.76) (4.93) (4.93) (4.96) (5.08) (4.73) 
Electronics 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.93) (0.93) (1.04) (0.93) (0.93) (0.92) (1.00) (0.95) (1.01) (0.93) 
Communications -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-1.41) (-1.35) (-1.14) (-1.38) (-1.18) (-1.02) (-1.11) (-1.03) (-1.06) (-1.13) 
Other high-tech 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 
 (0.75) (0.81) (0.90) (0.79) (0.89) (0.83) (0.87) (0.84) (0.87) (0.87) 
Allied IPO 0.10***          
 (3.38)          
Log(Total alliances)  0.08***         
  (3.46)         
Log(Horizontal alliances)   0.05**        
   (2.27)        
Log(Strategic alliances)    0.09***       
    (4.01)       
Log(Public alliances)     0.05**      
     (2.26)      
Log(R&D alliances)      0.05**     
      (2.02)     
Log(Cross tech transfers)       0.05    
       (1.61)    
Log(Licensing agreements)        0.04*   
        (1.72)   
Log(Manufacturing agreements)         -0.00  
         (-0.07)  
Log(Marketing agreements)          0.05* 
          (1.90) 
Constant 7.74*** 7.78*** 7.74*** 7.74*** 7.74*** 7.74*** 7.74*** 7.74*** 7.74*** 7.74*** 
 (166.08) (65.18) (165.85) (166.26) (165.84) (165.77) (165.76) (165.76) (165.65) (165.77) 
           
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,427 663 2,427 2,427 2,427 2,427 2,427 2,427 2,427 2,427 
Adjusted R2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
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Table 1.6: Logistic Regressions of Choice on IPO vs. Acquisition 
The dependent variable (ipo) is one if the firm goes public and zero if the firm is acquired. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1.A: Variable definitions. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 12 industry classifications. T-
statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables ipo ipo ipo ipo ipo ipo ipo ipo ipo ipo 
           
Alliance duration -0.62*** -0.10 0.17** 0.14** -0.36*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.32*** 0.25*** 0.33*** 
 (-5.37) (-1.25) (2.48) (2.16) (-3.54) (4.42) (4.38) (5.84) (4.03) (6.10) 
Log(Assets) 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 
 (10.56) (10.49) (10.72) (10.56) (10.73) (10.70) (10.77) (10.77) (10.82) (10.82) 
Log (Age) -0.10 -0.16* -0.19** -0.19** -0.13 -0.20** -0.20** -0.20** -0.20** -0.20** 
 (-1.21) (-1.92) (-2.31) (-2.38) (-1.55) (-2.44) (-2.46) (-2.48) (-2.44) (-2.51) 
Leverage -0.81*** -0.80*** -0.81*** -0.81*** -0.82*** -0.80*** -0.80*** -0.81*** -0.81*** -0.81*** 
 (-5.53) (-5.52) (-5.60) (-5.58) (-5.61) (-5.57) (-5.58) (-5.60) (-5.58) (-5.61) 
Market return -0.99 -0.92 -0.93 -0.79 -0.98 -0.73 -0.81 -0.76 -0.75 -0.77 
 (-1.39) (-1.33) (-1.35) (-1.15) (-1.40) (-1.05) (-1.18) (-1.11) (-1.09) (-1.12) 
Industry M/B 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05* 0.05* 0.04* 
 (1.25) (1.44) (1.50) (1.56) (1.41) (1.62) (1.61) (1.70) (1.67) (1.65) 
Industry return 0.64** 0.63** 0.65** 0.60** 0.65** 0.57* 0.62** 0.59** 0.60** 0.59* 
 (2.04) (2.05) (2.15) (1.98) (2.10) (1.90) (2.06) (1.97) (1.99) (1.96) 
Industry DER 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 
 (0.61) (0.62) (0.31) (0.48) (0.73) (0.56) (0.49) (0.46) (0.55) (0.45) 
Industry NPM -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.35) (-0.14) (-0.03) (-0.18) (-0.41) (-0.30) (-0.22) (-0.20) (-0.29) (-0.16) 
Industry ROA 0.20** 0.17* 0.18* 0.17* 0.19** 0.15 0.16* 0.15 0.16* 0.16* 
 (2.03) (1.76) (1.89) (1.76) (1.97) (1.63) (1.70) (1.62) (1.67) (1.67) 
Industry RDS -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (-0.21) (0.12) (0.24) (0.18) (-0.18) (-0.12) (0.10) (0.16) (0.08) (0.22) 
Allied firm 2.43***          
 (9.24)          
Total alliances  0.68***         
  (6.69)         
Horizontal alliance   0.66***        
   (3.86)        
Public alliance partner    0.88***       
    (5.26)       
Strategic alliance     1.84***      
     (7.85)      
R&D alliance      0.54***     
      (2.71)     
Licensing agreement       0.60***    
       (3.04)    
Manufacturing agreement        0.42   
        (1.38)   
Marketing agreement         0.53***  
         (2.92)  
Supply agreement          0.22 
          (0.53) 
Constant -0.81 -0.78 -0.73 -0.75 -0.81 -0.74 -0.70 -0.74 -0.73 -0.73 
 (-0.97) (-0.93) (-0.86) (-0.90) (-0.96) (-0.87) (-0.84) (-0.88) (-0.87) (-0.87) 
           
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,362 2,362 2,362 2,362 2,362 2,362 2,362 2,362 2,362 2,362 
Pseudo R2 0.299 0.288 0.274 0.279 0.290 0.272 0.273 0.270 0.272 0.270 
Log Likelihood -1098 -1115 -1137 -1130 -1112 -1140 -1139 -1143 -1140 -1144 
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Table 1.7: Hazard Rate Analysis of Time to IPO vs. Time to Acquisition 
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of an unlisted firm going public in a given year after it is founded. The firm’s 
founding date is from SDC VentureXpert database. Following the sampling procedure in Ozmel et al. (2013), I include 
only venture-backed firms in the tests to minimize the scope for heterogeneity in firm quality. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.A: Variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Variables hr_iva hr_iva hr_iva hr_iva hr_iva hr_iva hr_iva hr_iva hr_iva hr_iva hr_iva 
            
Allied firm 2.101*** 4.261***          
 (0.123) (0.513)          
Alliance duration  0.646*** 0.801*** 1.074** 1.027 0.977 1.072** 1.082*** 1.126*** 1.113*** 1.096*** 
  (0.036) (0.038) (0.035) (0.034) (0.043) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) 
High tech firm  1.434*** 1.459*** 1.556*** 1.549*** 1.538*** 1.546*** 1.569*** 1.566*** 1.563*** 1.558*** 
  (0.108) (0.110) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.114) (0.116) (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) 
Bubble  1.190* 1.232** 1.246** 1.225** 1.235** 1.280*** 1.250** 1.261** 1.258** 1.254** 
  (0.111) (0.112) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.117) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
Log(Assets)  1.172*** 1.172*** 1.182*** 1.179*** 1.180*** 1.180*** 1.182*** 1.184*** 1.183*** 1.184*** 
  (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Leverage  0.753*** 0.752*** 0.743*** 0.745*** 0.744*** 0.744*** 0.742*** 0.739*** 0.739*** 0.740*** 
  (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Market return  0.884 0.924 1.047 1.020 0.991 1.026 1.056 1.065 1.069 1.069 
  (0.269) (0.283) (0.319) (0.312) (0.304) (0.314) (0.323) (0.324) (0.325) (0.326) 
Industry M/B  1.030*** 1.035*** 1.036*** 1.035*** 1.036*** 1.036*** 1.036*** 1.038*** 1.038*** 1.037*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Industry return  1.256 1.229 1.164 1.181 1.183 1.197 1.172 1.166 1.172 1.168 
  (0.175) (0.173) (0.165) (0.166) (0.168) (0.169) (0.166) (0.164) (0.165) (0.165) 
Industry DER  1.080* 1.074* 1.053 1.062 1.058 1.059 1.055 1.048 1.050 1.053 
  (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Industry NPM  1.023*** 1.025*** 1.026*** 1.026*** 1.026*** 1.025*** 1.026*** 1.026*** 1.026*** 1.025*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Industry ROA  1.710*** 1.695*** 1.742*** 1.698*** 1.723*** 1.678*** 1.705*** 1.723*** 1.713*** 1.713*** 
  (0.141) (0.139) (0.147) (0.137) (0.143) (0.135) (0.138) (0.141) (0.139) (0.140) 
Industry RDS  1.082*** 1.090*** 1.095*** 1.094*** 1.095*** 1.084*** 1.090*** 1.093*** 1.092*** 1.093*** 
  (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Log(Total alliances)   2.478***         
   (0.231)         
Log(Horizontal alliances)    1.212**        
    (0.114)        
Log(Public alliances)     1.551***       
     (0.151)       
Log(Strategic alliances)      1.417***      
      (0.132)      
Log(R&D alliances)       1.377***     
       (0.148)     
Log(Licensing agreements)        1.331**    
        (0.157)    
Log(Cross tech transfers)         0.962   
         (0.137)   
Log(Manufacturing agreements)          1.260  
          (0.220)  
Log(Marketing agreements)           1.158 
           (0.120) 
            
N 2,888 2,801 2,801 2,801 2,801 2,801 2,801 2,801 2,801 2,801 2,801 
χ2 159.98 579.74 586.11 495.48 548.21 500.31 504.01 517.56 503.29 512.16 508.26 
Prob. > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Log Likelihood -9057.41 -8514.76 -8536.99 -8575.70 -8567.89 -8569.97 -8573.42 -8574.25 -8578.17 -8577.42 -8577.05 
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FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: 
THE SPILLOVER EFFECT OF INNOVATION EVENTS ON ALLIANCE PARTNERS  
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The search for the source of innovations has triggered a prolific new stream of literature in 
finance.  Innovations are not generated with one unified model. While many firms develop their 
innovations in house through their own R&D labs, other firms outsource innovative ideas externally 
by acquiring innovations or forming strategic alliance partners.  Prior research has examined 
acquisitions of innovative firms and found mixed evidence regarding the impact of these 
acquisitions on the productivity of acquiring firms12.  The role of strategic alliances, especially R&D 
alliances, has predominantly been associated with increasing innovative outputs, as measured by 
patent activity (see Sampson (2005) and Danzon et al. (2005)).  While patent-related innovations can 
potentially be a source of value for shareholders, the direct link between patents and their financial 
wealth consequence is not clear.  For example, for biotech firms, Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America, PhRMA, (2013) estimates the probability of a patented compound 
entering and making it through the drug discovery process to eventual FDA approval is as low as 
0.01% (1 in 10,000). It takes an average of 10-15 years and costs an average of $1.2 billion to 
develop a new drug (DiMasi and Grabowski, 2007), and only two in ten FDA approved drugs 
generate revenues that exceed average R&D costs. Chandy et al. (2006) also document that some 
                                                             
12 See, for example, Higgins and Rodriguez (2006); Atanassov, 2013; Seru (2013); and Sevilir and Tian, 2012, among 
others.  
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firms are significantly better at converting patented ideas into launched commercial products (drugs). 
Given the substantial risks and potential benefits associated with innovation, little is known about 
how investors of these innovative firms react to commercialized innovations.  Furthermore, despite 
the growing recognition of strategic alliances as a source of value creation for partnering firms, the 
impact of breakthrough innovations on the shareholder wealth of alliance partners is not clear. This 
paper is the first attempt to provide systematic evidence on the stock market reactions on 
breakthrough innovations by firms with strategic alliance partners, and the spillover effect of 
innovations on their alliance partners. 13 
Another unsettled issue in strategic alliance research is the divisions of gains captured by 
different alliances partners. Based on shareholders returns at the alliance announcements, research 
has documented asymmetric value creation for different types of alliances and individual partner 
characteristics.  For example, Chan et al. (1997) find that smaller strategic alliance partners have 
higher abnormal stock returns at the alliance announcements than larger alliance partners, albeit the 
dollar gains for two parties are similar. Moreover, their research finds that horizontal technological 
alliances receive larger abnormal returns than non-horizontal and non-technological alliances. On 
the other side, Das et al. (1998) and Kalaignanam et al. (2007) find asymmetric gains to the larger 
and smaller alliance partners.  All the prior research along this line addresses the divisions of gains 
among alliance partners by examining the abnormal returns around alliance announcements. No 
research to date has attempted to investigate this important issue in another setting such as 
innovation announcements. This paper contributes to the current literature by providing evidence 
on the spillover gains to partners during major innovation announcements, and sheds new light on 
the issue of division of gains among alliance partners.  
                                                             
13 Related to our paper is a case study by Huberman and Regev (2001), which provides a good illustrative example for 
our study. However, their paper focuses on contagious market speculation caused by a “non-event”, instead of real 
innovation events.  
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To test the effects of innovation on firms and their alliance partners, I use a comprehensive 
data set from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) website. I find economically and statistically 
significant gains for shareholders of pharmaceutical companies at the announcements of FDA drug 
approvals, consistent with Liu (2006) who examines stock market reactions to innovations news 
such as FDA approvals based on a sample of news reports during 1983-1993. The gains vary for 
different types of innovations-- from breakthrough innovations to incremental innovations.  More 
importantly, I find direct stock market evidence that the shareholders of these innovative firms’ 
strategic alliance partners also significantly benefit from spillovers effect of these innovations. Cross-
sectional multivariate analyses further reveal that young and newly listed innovators generate larger 
stock market response. Innovators with more growth opportunities make innovation 
announcements that cause bigger spillover effects on young, newly listed partners with more growth 
opportunities. Furthermore, I explore the risks associated with these innovators and their alliance 
partners by examining the stock market reactions to the FDA regulatory actions on some of drugs 
that cause adverse reactions for some customers. I find significant wealth loss for shareholders of 
these pharmaceutical companies and their alliance partners when the FDA issues warning letters 
regarding some of the adverse drug events and drug withdrawals. The wealth loss to innovators and 
their alliance partners around these negative events highlights the risk associated with innovations 
and also lends further support to the important roles of strategic alliance partnerships in innovations. 
Our findings specifically contribute to the current literature on innovations in the following 
ways. First, I test the value effects of innovation in a new setting by extending the concept beyond 
patent data to commercialized products.  Second, I provide evidence that investors of innovative 
firms recognize the upside, as well as the dark side, of innovations in a sophisticated way, as shown 
by the different scales of abnormal returns around various types of innovation-related events.  Third, 
our findings on the spillover effects of innovations on strategic alliance partners provide direct 
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evidence on the important role of strategic alliances on the R&D process of innovative firms. As 
such, I contribute to the literature on the external boundaries of firms in highly R&D intensive 
industries. Fourth, I shed light on an ongoing debate on asymmetric gains among alliance partners in 
a setting distinctive from prior research.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. I discuss the relevant literature on 
innovations and strategic alliances and develop a few propositions in the next section. Section 3 
explains the empirical settings and methods, and section 4 introduces the basic data sources and 
defines the main variables. Section 5 presents several sets of event study results on innovations and 
adverse events. I conduct tests for some conjectures regarding information leakage/anticipation and 
return reversal in Section 6, and cross-sectional multivariate analyses in Section 7. Section 8 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. PRIOR LITERATURE ON INNOVATIONS AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
 
Our paper relates and contributes to a few areas of the literature on innovations. The first 
and most closely related literature is on the market value of innovations. How do innovations create 
value for shareholders? Although theoretical work has established that innovation is a major driver 
of economic growth (Solow, 1957; Romer, 1987, 1990), there is limited evidence on the stock 
market value of innovations measured by patents. Some researchers find that the cross-sectional 
variation in firms’ stock market value has little to do with firms’ inventive endeavors measured by its 
R&D and patent output (Pakes, 1985).  Furthermore, the economic value of some patents is 
extremely high, whereas many other patents are worth relatively little (Austin, 1993). Chan, 
Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) find that “…evidence does not support a direct link between 
R&D spending and future stock returns.” However, using Tobin’s Q as a metric for shareholder 
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value, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) find that the ratios of R&D to assets, patents to R&D, and 
citations to patents, as well as the number of patents and patent citations positively affect firms’ 
stock market valuations. Following this methodology, Hirshleifer et al. (2013) find that innovation 
efficiency, patents or citations scaled by R&D, predicts future market returns after controlling for 
firm characteristics and risk. Most of the research along this line examines the stock market 
valuation on innovations within a longer time framework.  I attempt to make a contribution to 
research alone this line by providing some systematic evidence on investors’ interpretation of 
innovation announcements using event study methodology in a relatively short-term framework.   
The second stream of related literature is on the issue of external boundaries for firms 
conducting innovations. In the theoretical framework of incomplete contracts, Aghion and Tirole 
(1994) show that, due to the inefficiency of allocating property rights to the customers of 
innovations (big manufacturers who commercialize the innovations), it might be optimal for a firm 
to allocate property rights to the research unit and choose co-financing between the customers and 
investors. Taking the issue of firm boundaries to a slightly distinct framework, Rhodes-Kropf and 
Robinson (2008) propose that mergers and acquisitions (M&A) bring together firms with 
complementary assets and are more likely to enhance innovations. Subsequent empirical research, 
such as Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) and Sevilir and Tian (2012), documents that established firms 
can obtain valuable innovations and enhance firm value through M&A.  However, from a corporate 
governance perspective, Atanassov (2013) document that antitakeover legislations stifle innovations. 
In a similar view, Seru (2013) shows that moral hazard problems stifle innovations in conglomerates.  
Thus, the effect of M&A on corporate innovations is still inconclusive and unsettled in the literature.  
An alternative mechanism for more efficient corporate innovations is a collaborative 
partnership between two firms, such as strategic alliances and joint ventures.  Instead of a simple 
one-shot transaction deal or a complete integration by acquisitions, alliance partnerships are set by 
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two or more parties to last for a few years to achieve a specific purpose. Alliances are widely used in 
many industries, especially in highly innovative and R&D-intensive industries (Robinson, 2008).  
There is a robust literature on the value-enhancing benefits of this partnership arrangement. 
For example, McConnell and Nantell (1985), Chan, et al. (1997) find significant positive stock 
market abnormal returns for firms entering a joint ventures or strategic alliance partnerships. In a 
paper about block ownership by corporations and product market relationships, Allen and Phillips 
(2000) document that when there is a preexisting strategic alliance or other collaboration relationship 
between the purchasing and target firms, the target firms experience the largest increases in stock 
prices, investment, and profitability.  More recently, Lindsey (2008) finds that strategic alliances 
among venture backed firms increase the chance of these firms’ exit via either IPOs or acquisitions. 
Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov (2013) argue that alliances improve corporate governance by 
enhancing firm operating flexibility and reducing agency costs related to free cash flows and capital 
allocation within the firm. Ozmel, Robinson, and Stuart (2013) show that strategic alliances for bio-
tech startups provide an alternative source of funding to venture capital for these early stage high-
tech firms. 
On the impact of strategic alliances and innovations, there is some evidence that inter-firm 
alliances promote knowledge flows between alliance partners. For example, Sampson (2005) 
provides evidence on the significant value of strategic alliance experience on R&D output measured 
by patents. Also using patent data as proxies for knowledge flow, Gomes-Casseres et al. (2006) 
demonstrate that sharing technological knowledge happens more frequently between allied firms 
than two non-allied firms. Examining productivity in the biopharmaceutical industry, Danzon et al. 
(2005) find that products developed in alliances are more likely to be a commercial success, 
especially if one of the partners is a large firm.  
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This paper is also related to studies that investigate the stock market reactions to innovation 
events and alliance announcements. Using the short-term cumulative returns, a handful of papers 
have examined the market reactions to new product introductions (e.g., Chaney et al. 1991), good 
news in R&D (Liu, 2006), delays in new product introductions (Hendricks and Singhal, 1997), as 
well as product recalls (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985) and drug withdrawals (Ahmed et al. 2002). 
Another related paper by Boone and Ivanov (2012) examines the spillover effect of corporate 
bankruptcy on strategic alliance partners and find that non-bankrupt partners experience a negative 
stock price reaction around their alliance partners’ bankruptcy filing announcements. However, none 
of the prior research has looked at the spillover effect of breakthrough innovation on alliance 
partners (except for the case study by Huberman and Regev (2001)).  Given the recent research on 
innovation based on NBER patent data, this paper provides an alternative perspective by 
investigating the market perception of both positive and negative innovation events using FDA data.  
Furthermore, it is unclear in the current literature how the shareholder wealth gains are 
divided among the alliance partners. Based on shareholder returns at the alliance announcement, 
Chan et al. (1997) find that larger and smaller strategic alliance partners have quite different 
abnormal stock returns, although the dollar gains for two parties are similar. Yet other papers by 
Das et al. (1998) and Kalaignanam et al. (2007) find asymmetric gains to the larger and smaller 
alliance partners.  Moreover, some research also suggests that different types of alliance partnerships 
are associated with various benefits for alliance partners and should have varying stock market 
valuations. Most prior research addressing the divisions of gains among alliance partners examine 
the abnormal returns at alliance announcements. Our paper takes a different perspective by 
investigating the spillover gains to partners at major innovation announcements.  
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3. EMPIRICAL SETTING 
 
I set up our empirical tests in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, which is one of the most 
highly research-intensive industries in the U.S. According a report by Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), “...Pharmaceutical firms invest as much as five times more in research and development, 
relative to their sales, than the average U.S. manufacturing firm.”14 In 2012, it is estimated that 
PhRMA member companies invested $48.5 billion in biopharmaceutical R&D (PhRMA, 2013).  A 
number of notable prior research papers have studied innovation related issues in this industry15. 
The most appealing characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry for the purpose of this study is that 
the FDA has a fairly comprehensive and carefully compiled documentation of the history of the 
innovative drug development. FDA is a government regulatory agency and its various 
announcements regarding the drug innovations and adverse events related to drugs have large 
impact on both the customers and the financial market investors. Thus, it provides a relatively clean 
lab for testing the value and risk of significant innovations.  
Another very attractive feature of the pharmaceutical industry is that the FDA drug data 
make it possible to differentiate between incremental innovations, breakthrough innovations, and 
radical innovations in the sense of Chandy and Tellis (2000). An incremental innovation is one that 
makes only minor advancement on technology and minor improvement on customer benefit. A 
breakthrough innovation is a one that involves significant new scientific principles or elements that 
are substantially different from the existing innovations, or provide substantially greater customer 
                                                             
14  in “Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry.” Washington, DC: CBO, October 2006. 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf. 
15 Just to name a few from a long list of recently published papers in the pharmaceutical industry setting: Huberman and 
Regev (2001), Acemoglu and Linn (2004), Nicholson, Danzon, and McCullough (2005), Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), 
Gomes-Casseres, Jaffe, and Hagedoorn (2006), Lerner and Malmendier (2010), and Ozmel, Robinson, and Stuart (2013).  
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benefits than existing products. A radical innovation is an innovation that is a substantial technology 
breakthrough and a significant market breakthrough.  
In this paper, I define the FDA approval for Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) 
as an incremental innovation.  An ANDA is an application for FDA approval of a generic drug 
product, which is similar to the brand name drug in its biochemical ingredients and treatment effect,, 
but  costs much less than the brand name drug for the customers. A FDA approval for New Drug 
Application (NDA) is defined as a breakthrough innovation. In a NDA application, the companies 
sponsoring the drug innovation submit their clinical trial data to the FDA for review. As Appendix 
2.B shows, there are seven chemical types for these NDAs; except for the first chemical type (New 
Molecular Entity), all the other chemical types are defined as breakthrough innovations16. A small 
portion of these NDAs are Biologic License Application (BLA) for FDA licenses of some Biological 
products.   I define two types of FDA approvals as radical innovations, FDA approvals for New 
Molecular Entity (NME), which is an active ingredient that has never before been marketed in the 
U.S. in any form; and FDA approvals for orphan drugs, which are drugs and biologics “…intended 
for the safe and effective treatment, diagnosis or prevention of rare diseases/disorders that affect 
fewer than 200,000 people in the U.S.”17 These two types of FDA approvals are defined as radical 
innovations for two main reasons along the definitions of radical innovations. First, they are proved 
by the FDA agency and a wider scientific community as technology breakthroughs in finding safe 
and effective medical treatments for some commonly known difficult diseases such as various types 
of cancers, diabetes, AIDS, and Alzheimer's Disease, etc. Secondly, these two types of FDA 
approvals for manufacturing and marketing usually bring large amount of revenues for the 
innovating firms. According to the drug.com website, about sixty drugs have a yearly sales value 
                                                             
16 These six chemical types include: 1- New ester, new salt, or other noncovalent derivative; 2 - New formulation; 3 - 
New combination; 4 - New manufacturer; 5 - New indication (Beginning in 1994, Type 6 NDAs were tracked as efficacy 
supplements); 6 - Drug already marketed, but without an approved NDA.  See Appendix 2.B for more details.  
17 See FDA website: http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/default.htm.  
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above 1 billion18.  For the orphan drugs, even though the market size is relatively small 19, the 
revenues from these drugs are quite substantial. Over 50%, sometimes over 70%, of leading biotech-
pharmaceutical companies' revenues comes from orphan drugs (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011).   
Not all innovations related news is good news.  Sometimes the FDA approved drugs cause 
adverse drug reactions or even deaths for customers, and the FDA responds to these kinds of 
reports by issuing warning letters to the relevant pharmaceutical companies that manufacture or 
market these drugs. A small percentage of these warning letters result in the eventual withdrawals of 
these drugs. I examine the stock market reactions for these two types of adverse events related to 
pharmaceutical companies and their alliance partners.  
 
4. DATA AND METHODS 
 
4.1. Innovation sample  
The main samples of FDA approvals are from the FDA website, cross-checked with news 
reports about FDA approvals from the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, PR Newswire, Business Wire, 
The Associated Press, and Pharmaceutical Newsletter, etc. I keep all approvals sponsored by U.S. public 
pharmaceutical firms that have data on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The time 
periods for different innovation samples vary slightly due to the data availability of these different 
FDA approvals. More specifically, FDA Orphan Drug (OD) approvals are from the FDA Orphan 
Drug Product designation database from 1983 to 2013. Fewer than ten orphan drugs are developed 
by the industry in almost a decade between 1973 and 1983. After the enactment of the Orphan Drug 
                                                             
18 See http://www.drugs.com/stats/top100/2012/sales.  
19 Not small in absolute sense: about 7000 rare diseases are afflicting a total of 25 million Americans (1 in 12 of the total 
population), according to the 2005 report by Genetic and Rare Disease Center of the NIH. The average annual cost of 
Amgen’s Epogen and Neupogen (for anemia) is $5000 to $20,000; Genentech’s Rituxan (for rheumatoid arthritis), 
$15,000–20,000; Genzyme’s Cerezyme (for Gaucher’s disease), 150,000–225,000 (Lazonick and Tulum 2011).  
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Act of 1983, about 400 orphan drugs have been developed by pharmaceutical companies. The NME 
innovators are all U.S. pharmaceutical companies that received FDA NME drug approvals from 
1980 to 2013. The time period from 1980 to 1990 has fewer strategic alliances because the number 
of strategic alliance partnerships starts really to grow at a much faster rate since the 1990s. This 
explains the reason that fewer than half of companies with innovation announcements have alliance 
partners. For FDA NME approvals, I also search news reports for approvals and employ major 
news report dates for FDA approvals as a robustness check. The breakthrough innovation sample 
includes all FDA Original New Drug Approvals (NDAs and BLAs) from 1990 to 201320.  Table 2.1 
summarizes the number of NDA applications and FDA approvals, as wells as NME approvals by 
year. Overall, about 71.64% of the NDA applications are approved, and about 28.28% of NDA 
approvals are NME approvals. The applications and approvals seem to follow a quite even path over 
the years, with no apparent peak in any single year.  
 
4.2. Alliances sample 
 The Strategic Alliances and Joint Venture section of the Thomson Financial Securities Data 
Company (SDC) database is the source for our original alliance sample. I keep strategic alliances and 
joint ventures with all alliance partners being domestic firms. The alliance sample is merged with the 
various innovation samples , to get alliance characteristics of these innovator firms. Based on the 
previous research (Chan et al., 1997), I infer that alliances formed within five years and above five 
years are likely to result in different spillover effects. Therefore, I define alliances formed within five 
years as short-term alliances and those formed above five years as long-term alliances.   
I also examine the effect of alliance characteristics by differentiating alliance types such as 
horizontal alliances, strategic alliances, joint ventures, research and development agreements, licensing agreements, and 
                                                             
20 See Appendix 2.A and 2.B for the distributions of NDAs and definitions of other FDA terms.  
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manufacturing agreements. Specifically, strategic alliances are collaborative agreements for some common 
goals among two or more distinctive firms whereas join ventures involve creating an independent legal 
entity that operating separately from original cooperative partners. Horizontal alliance is defined as 
alliance where two partners have same three-digit SIC code, R&D Alliances indicates that the 
pharmaceutical firm has a research and development agreement with the partners. Likewise, licensing 
alliances indicates that the pharmaceutical firm has a licensing agreement with the partners. 
Manufacturing agreements indicates that the pharmaceutical firm has a manufacturing agreement with 
the partners. 
 
4.3. Event study method 
Following Brown and Warner’s (1985) standard event study methodology, I measure stock 
market abnormal returns as cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the eleven-day period (-5, +5), 
five-day period (-2, +2), and three-day period (-1, +1) around the announcement dates.  The 
abnormal return for security i on day t (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the actual return, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 , less the security’s expected 
return,  (∝�i + β
�
iRmt ) , 
    𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 - ( ∝�𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡  ) ,  
where ∝�i and ?̂?𝑖 are constant and coefficient obtained from the Ordinary Least Square regression of 
security returns on market returns during the estimation period, and  𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return on the market 
index for day t.  The CRSP value-weighted market index return is estimated over the days -50 to -
200, where day zero denotes the day on which FDA approval or other news is declared. 
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5. THE VALUE OF INNOVATIONS AND SPILLOVER ON ALLIANCE 
PARTNERS 
 
In this section, I examine the wealth effects of innovation announcements as well as the 
spillover effect on alliance partners for the following types of innovations: radical innovations (FDA 
orphan drug and NME drug approvals), breakthrough innovations (NDA and BLA approvals), and 
incremental innovations (ANDA approvals). I also examine the wealth effects of negative 
innovation-related announcements, i.e., FDA warning letters and NME drug withdrawals, for 
announcing firms and their alliance partners.  
 
5.1. Wealth effect on strategic alliance announcements 
As a prelude to the innovation spillover effect on alliance partners, I first examine the 
abnormal returns around alliance partnership announcements to show that how investors gauge the 
value-enhancing effect of various collaborative agreements among pharmaceutical companies and 
their partners. Table 2.2 shows the stock market reactions on alliance announcements on three event 
windows: (-5, +5), (-2, +2), (-1, +1).  I focus on the three day event window in this section, since 
almost all of the event windows display similar patterns. The mean initial alliance announcement 
abnormal return is 1.87% for the whole sample, 1.90% for strategic alliances, and 1.50% for joint 
ventures. This result is higher than the abnormal returns in Boone and Ivanov (2012), but is 
consistent with the announcement returns for subsample of high-tech alliances (Chan et al. 1997). 
The three-day mean CAR for long-term strategic alliance announcements, although positive, is not 
statistically significant, possibly due to the market’s uncertainty about the value of strategic alliances 
formed in the earlier years of the sample. Given that alliances really started to grow exponentially 
after the 1980’s, the market may have taken a while to recognize the value-increasing role of alliance 
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partnerships. This result that short-term alliances with eventual duration greater than five years have 
higher announcement returns is consistent with Boone and Ivanov (2012) who use four years as a 
cut off point for long term and short term distinction. For other types of alliances, horizontal 
alliances fare a little better than the overall sample, which confirms that the market perceives 
alliances formed in the same industry have higher potential value for partnering firms. 
Manufacturing alliances also have slightly higher announcement returns (2.45%), whereas R&D 
alliances have the highest abnormal return (2.80%) among all types of alliances. As I will see in later 
sections, the alliance announcement returns indeed have some degree of predictability for the 
spillover effects of innovations on alliance partners. 
 
5.2. Wealth effect and spillover on alliance partners around radical innovations 
In this section, I start to examine the announcement returns of radical innovations, defined 
as the FDA orphan drug approvals and NME drug approvals. Panel A of Table 2.3 shows the 
results for the wealth effect of FDA orphan drug approvals and the spillover effect on alliance 
partners. The overall sample of orphan drug innovators gains an abnormal return of 2.81% in a 
three day event window, statistically significant at the 1% level.  If I use the average market 
capitalization ($10,782 million) of the pharmaceutical companies as Nicholson et al. (2005) 
calculated for a sample of 421 publicly traded firms between 1991 and 2000, the 2.81% gain 
translates into $302 million dollar wealth creation. The orphan drug innovators with strategic alliance 
partners have a slightly lower average abnormal return of 2.39%, which possibly indicates that the 
investors are sophisticated enough to know that these radical innovations are not accomplished 
solely by these innovators and attribute some of the wealth to their alliance partners. Indeed, the 
strategic alliance partners of the innovators also experience positive stock market reactions for 
different types of alliances, although the significant announcement returns appear mainly in a wider 
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event window and are relatively smaller than the CARs for the innovators. More specifically, the 
average spillover effect on strategic alliance partners of orphan drug innovators is 1.79% in the five-
day event window, which is statistically significant at a 5% level, translating into a $193 million 
wealth gain.  The shorter three-day event window also have a positive return of 1.56%, although not 
statistically significant (p = 0.14).  The spillover effect on horizontal alliance partners of orphan drug 
innovators follow a similar pattern, but is larger in scale (2.79% for a five-day event widow), 
consistent with prior literature showing that the market perceives within-industry alliance 
partnerships as more valuable.  Overall, the results in Panel A of Table 3 provide strong support for 
the positive market perception of radical innovations for innovative firms as well as the spillover 
effect on alliance partners.  
Turning to Panel B, C and D of Table 2.3, I present the announcement returns of the FDA 
NME approvals. Panel B shows the announcement CARs for of FDA NME approvals before 
deleting confounding effects; Panel C presents the wealth effect of FDA NME approvals after 
deleting confounding effects; and Panel D shows the results using news report dates. The examples 
of confounding events are litigation and lawsuits, unfavorable analyst coverage, uneven stock season, 
small stocks under alliance termination threats, etc.21  The abnormal returns for NME innovators 
and their alliance partners largely follow a similar patterns as orphan drug innovators, but vary in 
scale and statistical significance to different degrees.  For all NME innovators, the abnormal returns 
range from 4.14% to 4.30% in a three-day event window, which is much higher than the wealth 
creation for orphan drug innovators. For NME innovators with alliance partners, the abnormal 
return is again lower than that of the overall sample, ranging from 1.74% to 3.76%, depending on 
the exclusion of firms with apparent confounding events. Furthermore, the statistical significance 
varies quite a bit for different sample selection criteria and announcement dates. For the alliance 
                                                             
21 I currently only consider the confounding events for the innovators, not for alliance partners. 
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partners of the NME innovators, although the announcement returns follow a similar pattern as in 
the orphan drug innovations, the significance levels vary for different situations as well.  There are 
three possible explanations for the above results.  
The first possibility is that there are other confounding events for NME innovators and their 
alliance partners around the radical innovation announcements. If a pharmaceutical company gets a 
FDA approval for NME drug and has a large negative stock return on the announcement day, it 
would be very likely that this company has some other negative news happening during the event 
window or the stock market does not like this particular drug for some reason. For example, on July 
16, 1998, Celgene Corp. was approved by FDA for a brand name drug called “Thalomid”, and PR 
Newswire reported this exciting approval news on the same day, but also stated that this drug is 
controversial and potentially dangerous, and numerous other news reports also caution the risk 
associated with this drug22.  In the three-day event window, Celgene Corp.’s stock return is about -
11%, a huge wealth loss resulted from seemingly good news.   
The second possible reason is that for these radical innovations, there are hundreds of news 
reports about the various stages of clinical trial results, expert opinions, and FDA reviews and so on 
prior the FDA approvals. The informational content of FDA approvals is therefore greatly mitigated 
by all these earlier news reports.  The EntreMed featured in Huberman and Regev (2001) paper is a 
good example in this respect: “A Sunday New York Times article on a potential development of new 
cancer-curing drugs caused EntreMed’s stock price to rise from 12.063 at the Friday close, to open 
at 85 and close near 52 on Monday.” Although this is a non-innovative event, from this example, I 
can get an idea how the stock price would react to real innovative events prior to FDA approvals.  
                                                             
22 USA Today reported on July 17, 1998 the FDA approval with a title “Infamous thalidomide approved FDA's limits on 
distribution aim to prevent birth defects”; earlier in January, 1998, New York Times covered this drug and stated that it is 
“…the world's most notorious agent of birth defects”. Surprisingly, this drug has not been withdrawn from the U.S. 
market despite hundreds of negative news reports and warnings, and most recently is trying to get Canadian drug agency 
approval for marketing it in Canada. See, for example, “Thalidomide users are warned about clot risk”, Nanaimo Daily 
News (British Columbia), May 2, 2013.  
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Another example is Eli Lilly & Co.’s Humalog, which was approved by the FDA on June 17, 1996, 
but a Lexis-Nexis search on this drug shows that there are about thirty good news reports about the 
blockbuster drug prior to the final approval date.   
The third possible reason for the difference in statistical significance associated with 
abnormal returns around FDA NME drug approvals is insider trading which makes the drug stock 
very volatile around FDA approvals of the blockbuster drugs.  Both popular press and academic 
research has shown that there are severe information leaks on drug stocks and R&D-intensive firms. 
A Wall Street Journal article states that “...So many drug stocks are moving on rumors about the 
inner workings of the Food and Drug Administration that the federal agency has hired a law firm to 
help it guard against leaks.”23 However, there is no sign of actually stopping insider trading on drug 
stocks, as indicated in the more recent Wall Street Journal reports on this issue24. In a large sample 
of insider-trading events, Coff and Lee (2003) find that insider trading is used as to appropriate rent 
from R&D intensive firms.  Our subsequent tests on information leakage/anticipation and return 
reversals in Section 6 provide supports for these conjectures. 
Overall, the results in Panel B, C, and D of Table 2.3 display that there are substantial 
abnormal returns from radical innovations for these innovating firms and also various degrees of 
spillovers on the alliance partners of the innovators as well.  
 
5.3. Wealth effect and spillover on partners around breakthrough innovations 
The issues discussed above for NME radical innovations are much less severe for the more 
“ordinary” breakthrough innovations such as NDAs. For the FDA NDA approvals, the innovation 
announcement returns are smaller in the three-day event window: 1.23% for overall NDA approval 
sample (p = 0.001); and 1.14% for the NDA innovators with alliance partners (p = 0.001). There are 
                                                             
23 See “FDA Looks to Stop Leaks on Drug Stocks”, Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1991.  
24 See, for example, “Probe Deepens of Alleged Inside Trades at FDA”, Wall Street Journal, June 03, 2011.  
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also significant spillover effects on alliance partners, 0.62% in a three-day event window, which is 
roughly half of the abnormal return of that of the innovators (p = 0.07). Strategic alliance partners 
gain a 0.59% of the abnormal returns in a three-window, with a p value of 0.03. Short-term as well 
as long-term strategic alliance partners both have significant announcement returns from their 
partners’ NDA approvals, while it takes relatively more time for long-term alliance partners to 
realize the gains (eleven-day event window). Taken together, the results in Table 2.4 show that the 
wealth effect of breakthrough innovations is large for the innovators and this wealth effect also 
benefits the innovators’ alliance partners.  
 
5.4. Wealth effect and spillover on partners around incremental innovations 
Table 2.5 presents the results on the abnormal returns around incremental innovations 
announcements, i.e. FDA ANDA approvals. The pattern of abnormal returns and spillover effect 
resembles those of breakthrough innovation announcements, whereas smaller in scale. The average 
three-day CAR is 0.56% (p = 0.001) for all ANDA innovators, and 0.38% (p = 0.001) for ANDA 
innovators with alliance partners. Strategic alliance partners have a spillover of 0.22% (p = 0.08), 
whereas long-term alliance partners have a spillover of 0.49% (p= 0.01) in a three-day event window. 
Surprisingly, the joint ventures partners of the ANDA innovators have a significant negative 
spillover from these incremental innovation announcements, which could possibly result from some 
confounding events such as litigations or other negative issues among the partners. To summarize, 
the results in Table 2.5 once again reinforce the similar conclusion from previous sections: 
incremental innovations also result in substantial financial gains for innovators and their alliance 
partners, although alliance partners gain less in all situations, highlighting the asymmetric gains from 
alliance partnerships.  
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5.5. Wealth loss and spillover on partners around FDA warning letters 
In this section and the next section, I examine the wealth loss caused by some adverse events 
related to pharmaceutical innovations and test if our premise of spillover effect on alliance partners 
still holds in these events. Panel A of Table 2.6 shows the results for wealth loss for pharmaceutical 
companies and their alliance partners around FDA posted warning letters. In a three-day event 
window and five-day event window, there are significant negative abnormal returns of -0.43% (p = 
0.08) and -0.59% (p = 0.05) respectively around the FDA warning letter posted dates for the overall 
sample of 462 observations. For FDA warned firms with alliance partners, the negative CAR is -0.48% 
in the three-day even window, although not statistically significant (p = 0.12). For five-day and 
eleven-day event windows, the wealth losses are -0.84% (p = 0.04) and -1.42% (p = 0.01) 
respectively. Therefore, there is substantial wealth loss for firms getting FDA warning letters.  
Interestingly, alliance partners of these FDA warned firms lose almost the same amount from the 
bad news: -0.46% (p = 0.10) for a three-day window and -0.74% (p = 0.05) for a five-day event 
window.  As a robustness check, I also examined the cross-sectional mean abnormal returns of all 
alliance partners in Panel B of Table 2.6, instead of only looking at the portfolios formed by firms 
getting FDA warning letters. The results are largely similar to that of Panel A. Collectively, the 
results in Table 2.6 demonstrate that innovation is a risky business with many uncertainties, and 
there could be the substantial wealth loss associated with both innovations and alliance partnerships.  
 
5.6. Wealth loss and spillover on partners around NME drug withdrawals 
Another adverse event related to drug development is the possibility of drug withdrawals.  
Popular press has featured some high profile drug withdrawals that caused the huge loss of wealth 
for some pharmaceutical companies. For example, Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS)’s withdrawal of 
application for Vanlev caused its stock price to plummet by $15, or 23%, a total wealth loss of $30 
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billion for the drug giant25.  Ahmed et al. (2002) find that shareholders suffer massive wealth losses 
around the drug withdrawals and also positive CARs for the competitors of the firms that have drug 
withdrawals. I hand collect a sample of 39 NME drug withdrawals from Wall Street Journal (37 cases) 
and New York Times (2 cases) and test the spillover effect of the drug withdrawals on alliance 
partners.  The results in Table 2.7 demonstrate that the shareholder wealth loss is consistent with 
Ahmed et al. (2005), but is even slightly larger (9.27%, p = 0.01) because their sample also contains 
other drug withdrawals other than NME drugs, which cause relatively smaller damage for affected 
firms. There are 18 firms that have NME drug withdrawals and also have strategic alliance partners. 
The wealth loss for shareholders of these firms is relatively smaller: - 3.69%, p = 0.02. Looking at 
Panel A for alliance partners formed portfolios based the firms withdrawn drugs, the spillover 
effects are negative in most cases, although not statistically significant in general. The lack of 
statistical significance is possibly due to the small sample size and the fact that withdrawn drugs are 
usually approved a few years ago and the drug withdrawal may not affect the partner much if the 
partnership is not based on that particular drug since their partnership could be based on a different 
drug development. Turning to Panel B of Table 2.7 which examines the cross-sectional mean 
abnormal return of alliance partners, I find some evidence of significant negative spillover on 
horizontal alliance partners in a three-day window: -1.37%, p = 0.10. Moreover, in a eleven-day 
window, short-term strategic alliances suffer a large -5.23% wealth loss from their partners’ drug 
withdrawals. Jointly, Table 2.7 shows that there are sometimes large wealth losses from alliance 
partners’ extreme adverse events.  
 
  
                                                             
25 See “IBM, Intel Drop on Profit News As Rally in Stocks Comes to a Halt”, Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2000.  
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6. TESTS FOR INFORMATION LEAKAGE/ANTICIPATION AND RETURN 
REVERSALS 
 
As I discuss in Section 5.2, there are various news reports about the different stages of 
clinical trial results, expert opinions, and FDA reviews prior to the FDA approvals.  Therefore, there 
might be some anticipation in the stock market regarding these FDA approvals.  Moreover, the 
possibility of information leakage for the purpose of insider trading also exists for the drug stocks, 
given the documented larger insider gains of R&D intensive firms (Aboody and Lev, 2000).   
At the same time, it is also of interest to examine if there is any return reversal after these 
innovation events.  Liu (2006) finds evidence of a negative drift after R&D news events and 
attributes the drift to investors’ expectation errors on these news events. That is, given the inherent 
uncertainty in risky new endeavors, it is difficult for investors to precisely evaluate the economic 
value of these innovative events.  Mispricing for innovation events is more likely for firms with a 
weak technology base, high B/M ratio, and larger size. I therefore test for the possibilities of 
information leakage/anticipation prior to various innovation events and return reversals after these 
events by looking at CARs with different event windows.  
To conduct these tests, I use the same market model and daily stock returns from CRSP files 
to calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for various pre-event windows such as (-10,-2), (-
20,-2), (-30,-2), (-60,-2), (-90,-2), (-120,-2), (-20,-11), (-60,-11), and (2,10) for information 
leakage/anticipation effects, and post-event windows such as (2,30), (2,60), (2,90), (2,120), (31,60), 
(61,90), and (91,120) for return reversal effect. The significance test statistics include Patell Z, Cross-
sectional t-stat as well as its standardized counterpart a.k.a. Boehmer’s et al. (1991) t-stat.  
The tests results for all Orphan Drug announcements are presented in Panel A of Table 2.8. 
There is little evidence of either information leakage/anticipation effect or return reversal effects. 
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The only exception is during event window ((61, 90)), where the CAR is negative and significant, 
which possibly indicates either some return reversal or some other negative events. Since the CARs 
for different event windows, such as (31, 60), (31, 60), and (91, 120), are not consistently significant 
and negative, I cannot make any meaningful inference regarding the return reversals for Orphan 
drug announcements. I also test the subsample of OD innovators with alliance partners to see if 
there is any different pattern since those OD innovators with partners might share information with 
their alliance partners and therefore are more likely to have information leakage effect prior to the 
announcements.  As I can see from Panel B of Table 2.8, the CARs and their statistical significances 
for pre-event windows and post-event windows are not that different from those for all OD 
innovators. Thus, I conclude that OD innovation announcements do not have discernable pre-
announcement information leakage or post-announcement return reversals. The lack of consistent 
evidence on information leak/anticipation and return reversals for these OD innovators suggests 
that the stock market reaction is generally well captured during the announcement period. It 
provides further support for the wealth effect and spillover on partners I find in Panel A of Table 
2.3.  
In Table 2.9, I provide results for the similar tests for NME drug announcements. The 
information leakage/anticipation effect for this type of innovation news is more noticeable. During 
the event windows (-10, -2) and (-20, -2), the CARs are 0.77%, and 0.99%, and statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  The difference between NME drug announcements and Orphan drug 
announcements is that the former has a relatively longer and established history, and has a larger 
number of announcements per year. It is quite likely that investors, especially insiders, pay more 
attention to this kind of announcement than an OD announcement, since OD news tends to be 
more uncertain with more unpredictable outcomes. So the stock market reaction to NME 
announcements is not as concentrated on the announcement period, consistent with the lower 
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statistical significance in Panel B of Table 2.3.  Furthermore, there is evidence of return reversals for 
the NME drug announcements, which is consistent with the findings in Liu (2006), who uses 
different types of innovation announcements.  The return reversals could be attributed to the 
investors’ expectation errors due to overoptimism for some of these drug announcements. It may 
also relate to some subsequent negative news announcements regarding these NME drugs.  Panel B 
of Table 2.9 presents the results for the subsample of NME innovators with alliance partners to see 
if there is any different pattern.  The CARs and their statistical significances for pre-event windows 
and post-event windows are similar to those for all NME innovators. In sum, NME innovation 
announcements do have some discernable pre-announcement information leakage/anticipation or 
post-announcement return reversals.   
Table 2.10 shows the results for the similar tests for NDA drug announcements.  As I 
discussed earlier in the paper, these NDA drugs are breakthrough innovations, but are more 
“ordinary” innovations in nature and much larger in terms of the number of approvals per year.  
Presumably, the gains from insider trading on these drugs might not be large enough to provide high 
incentives for insiders to gather insider information. Not surprisingly, I do not see any significant 
information leakage and anticipation for this type of innovation announcements.  There is, however, 
some consistent evidence of return reversals on these drug approvals, possibly for the similar reason 
of expectation errors or other subsequent negative news.  
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 present the results for the test of information leakage/anticipation and 
return reversals for the FDA warnings and NME withdrawals. Both types of adverse news events 
demonstrate some information leakage/anticipation effects. For FDA warnings, the event windows 
(-30, -2) and (-60, -2) have CARs of -1.53% and -1.29% and are statistically significant at the 1% and 
5% levels, respectively, based on the Boehmer’s et al (1991) t-statistics.  For NME withdrawals, 
evidence of the information leakage/anticipation is relatively weaker. The CARs for event windows 
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(-90, -2) and (-120, -2) are -5.70% and -12.2%, but the statistical significance level are lower and not 
that consistent across different test statistics.  The possible reason is that for the FDA warnings, the 
sample size is much larger, and there are various formal communications, such as Form 483, 
regarding the adverse events related to the eventual warning letters26.  Some of the communications 
in Form 483 might contain quite damaging information for the firms receiving these letters.  On the 
other hand, I do not find consistent evidence of return reversals for both FDA warning letters and 
NME withdrawals, which means that all the stock market reaction on these negative news events for 
the innovators is captured by the announcement period CARs.  
Overall, the tests for information leakage/anticipation and return reversals show that the 
effects depend on the types of the innovation events. Some of the events have more information 
leakage/anticipation effect because of the higher information-gathering incentives brought by larger 
insider gains, whereas other events are more likely to cause return reversals due to investors’ 
expectation errors on these drug stocks.  
 
7. CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSES OF INNOVATION ABNORMAL RETURNS AND 
SPILLOVERS 
 
To gain further insight into the cross-sectional variation in the stock market response to 
innovation events, I conduct regression analyses of the innovation abnormal returns for innovators 
and spillover effects on their alliance partners in this section.   
In Table 2.13, I regress the cumulative abnormal returns for each innovator firm measured 
from a three-day event window (-1, +1) against innovation event variables, innovator firm 
characteristics, and alliance characteristics variables.  The innovation events variables tested in this 
                                                             
26 See http://www.linkedin.com/groups/What-s-difference-between-Form-3826946.S.107029617 for the discussion 
regarding FDA Form 483. 
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table include dummy variables radical innovation, radical innovation 1 (OD drug), and radical innovation 2 
(NME drug). Radical innovation indicates that the innovation announcement is a FDA Orphan Drug 
(OD) or NME drug approval. The other two dummy variables, radical innovation 1 (OD drug) and 
radical innovation 2 (NME drug), indicate the innovation announcements fall into the subcategories of 
two types of radical innovations.  The innovator firm characteristics of interest are newly listed 
innovator firm (IPO innovator), innovator size, Tobin’s Q, and innovator with only one alliance partner 
(single alliance innovator).  The alliance characteristics variables capture the various types of contracts or 
agreements between innovator firms and their alliance partners. The variables include strategic alliance, 
R&D agreement, horizontal alliance, joint venture, public alliance, among others.  All variables are defined in 
Appendix 2.A: Variable definitions. The sample for Table 2.13 includes announcements events for 
radical innovations (FDA Orphan Drug approvals and FDA NME drug approvals), and 
breakthrough innovations (FDA Original New Drug Approvals). These innovation events generate 
larger abnormal returns and have relatively larger spillover effect than incremental innovation events 
such as FDA ANDA approvals.    
Panel A of Table 2.13 shows descriptive statistics and Panel B presents the cross-sectional 
regression analysis of the innovator’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) during the three-day event 
window (Innovator CAR (3-day), or icar3). One of the main results in this table is that radical 
innovations, especially FDA NME approvals, generate substantially larger abnormal returns than 
other types of more “ordinary” innovations. The regression coefficients for the variable radical 
innovation are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in most regression models.  When I 
separate the radical innovations into OD drug and NME drug approvals in regression models 7 to 
11, I see that the larger abnormal returns mainly come from the latter.  Secondly, innovators that are 
publicly listed for 5 or less years and smaller innovators experience higher stock market gains when 
they announce innovation events.  In particular, in models 1 to 4, the coefficients for innovator size 
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are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. In models 5 to 11, the coefficients for IPO 
innovator are positive and statistically significant in most models. Third, consistent with the univariate 
results, innovators with alliance partners experience smaller abnormal returns, suggesting that the 
alliance partners may be sharing in some of the gain from the innovation event. The coefficients for 
all kinds of alliance characteristics are negative and many are statistically significant.  
I now turn to the regression analyses of the innovation spillover effect on alliance partners. 
In Table 2.14, Panel A is the descriptive statistics and Panel B presents the cross-sectional regression 
analysis of the average partners’ cumulative abnormal returns (partner CAR(3-day), or pmcar3) during 
the three-day event window 27 .  The main independent variables are similar to those for the 
regressions of the innovators’ abnormal returns. However, since the goal is to investigate the 
spillover effect of innovation events on alliance partners, I include the innovators’ CARs in the 
regressions to test the degree of surprise contained in the innovation announcements, following the 
previous literature such as Kohers and Kohers (2004), Oxley, Sampson, and Silverman (2009), and 
Chen, Ho, and Ik (2005). The coefficients for innovators’ abnormal returns (Innovator CAR (3-day)) 
are positive and highly statistically significant at the 1% level for all regression models in Panel B.    
The spillover effect on alliance partners is even stronger for radical innovations with a large degree 
of surprise, as shown by the significant, positive interaction between radical innovations and 
innovator CAR.  In addition, I control for some other variables, such as size, Tobin's Q, and alliance 
characteristics.  As far as partner characteristics are concerned, IPO partners tend to experience 
larger spillover; partners’ Tobin’s Q contributes to larger spillover; and newly listed partners tend to 
experience larger spillover gains.  The innovators’ Tobin’s Q is also positively associated with the 
spillover effect for partners.  Moreover, the more partners the innovator has (Log(Num ptn per 
                                                             
27 I also use 5-day and 11-day event window CARs as dependent variables and find similar results, although there is 
slight difference in statistical significance levels, which is consistent with the univariate results in Table 3. The innovator 
CARs, partners CARs, Tobin’s Q, and size variables are all winsorized at 1% and 99% percent level to reduce the impact 
of outliers. 
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innovator)), the less spillover there is for each partner. Along the same lines, partners who only have 
one alliance (with the innovator) also get larger spillover during the 3-day event window (Model 3).  
Finally, the negative and statistically significant (1%) coefficients for the variable Log(Alliance duration) 
in all models show that short-term, or more recent alliance partners experience larger spillover 
effects..  
Taken together, the cross-sectional analyses further support the univariate results regarding 
the abnormal returns to innovators and spillover effect to their alliance partners around the 
innovation announcements. The results in this section also shed light on some other important 
variables, such as firm age, firm size, and Tobin’s Q in leading to the stock market response of 
innovation events for innovators and their alliance partners.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
             This paper explores the relationship of firm boundaries and the market value of innovations.  
I advance the proposition that firms reap large stock market wealth from their innovation 
announcements. I take the proposition to a novel setting with comprehensive innovation 
documentation. I classify the innovations in the pharmaceutical industry as radical, breakthrough, 
and incremental innovations based on their scientific and technological achievements and customer 
benefit enhancements. I find corresponding abnormal announcement returns for these three types 
of innovations. More importantly, I provide direct stock market evidence that the alliance partners 
of these pharmaceutical innovators also benefit from the spillover effect of these innovations, 
although the gains are smaller than that for the innovators.  Cross-sectional analyses of the abnormal 
returns to innovators and spillover effect on partners demonstrate that young and newly listed 
innovators with better growth opportunities play a more important role in leading to greater degree 
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of surprises and associated spillover effect. I also examine the risk associated with these innovations 
by looking at the wealth losses and spillover to alliance partners around two sets of adverse events 
related to the pharmaceutical innovators, and found substantial wealth loss for them and their 
alliance partners.   
Our findings make significant contributions to the current literature on innovations by 
shifting the setting of innovations from patent data to pharmaceutical drug development. I find that 
the stock market highly values strategic alliance partnership among high-tech industries such as 
biopharmaceutical industry. I also differentiate the innovations along the technological breakthrough 
and market breakthrough dimensions and find that investors value these innovations accordingly. 
The spillover effects of innovations on strategic alliance partners provide direct evidence on the 
close relationship between innovations and alliance partnerships. I also examine the division of gains 
among alliance partners in a new setting and find evidence supporting the asymmetric gains 
hypothesis between commercializing pharmaceutical firms and their research partners.  
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Table 2.1: Summary of New Drug Applications and Approvals by Year 
 
The data on New Drug Application (NDA) received and approved is from the FDA website. A FDA NDA approval 
involves submitting data from specific technical viewpoints for review, including chemistry, pharmacology, medical, 
biopharmaceutics, and statistics. New Molecular Entity (NME) is an active ingredient that has never before been 
marketed in the U.S. in any form.   
 
Year NDAs Received  NDAs Approved   NMEs Approved 
1980 162 114 12 
1981 129 96 27 
1982 202 116 28 
1983 269 94 14 
1984 217 142 22 
1985 148 100 30 
1986 120 98 20 
1987 142 69 21 
1988 126 67 21 
1989  118 87 22 
1990 98 64 23 
1991 112 63 30 
1992 100 91 26 
1993 99 70 25 
1994 114 62 22 
1995 121 82 28 
1996 120 131 53 
1997 128 121 39 
1998 121 90 30 
1999 139 83 35 
2000 115 98 27 
2001 98 66 24 
2002 105 78 17 
2003 109 72 21 
2004 115 119 36 
2005 116 80 20 
2006 124 101 22 
2007 123 78 18 
2008 140 89 24 
2009 146 90 26 
2010 103 93 21 
2011 105 99 30 
2012 102 96 34 
Total 4168 2999 848 
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Table 2.2: Market Reaction to Strategic Alliances Announcements  
The alliance announcement dates are from the Strategic Alliances and Joint Venture section of the Securities 
Data Company (SDC) database. The strategic alliances and joint ventures are formed between two or more 
U.S. firms, of which at least one pharmaceutical company received FDA NME approvals during the period of 
1980 to 2013.  
 
Type of alliances Event window N 
Mean 
CARs 
T 
Statistics 
P 
Value 
All alliance announcements (-5,+5) 493 1.75*** 3.00 0.003 
All alliance announcements (-2,+2) 493 1.63*** 3.43 0.001 
All alliance announcements (-1,+1) 493 1.87*** 4.58 0.000 
Horizontal alliances (-5,+5) 335 1.96*** 2.71 0.007 
Horizontal alliances (-2,+2) 335 1.66*** 2.84 0.005 
Horizontal alliances (-1,+1) 335 2.02*** 4.01 0.000 
Strategic alliances (-5,+5) 450 1.54*** 2.48 0.013 
Strategic alliances (-2,+2) 450 1.69*** 3.29 0.001 
Strategic alliances (-1,+1) 450 1.90*** 4.31 0.000 
Short term strategic alliances  (-5,+5) 325 1.97*** 2.89 0.004 
Short term strategic alliances  (-2,+2) 325 2.36*** 3.90 0.000 
Short term strategic alliances  (-1,+1) 325 2.27*** 4.32 0.000 
Long term strategic alliances (-5,+5) 125 0.42 0.31 0.758 
Long term strategic alliances (-2,+2) 125 -0.06 -0.06 0.950 
Long term strategic alliances (-1,+1) 125 0.93 1.16 0.247 
Joint ventures (-5,+5) 43 3.99** 2.45 0.018 
Joint ventures (-2,+2) 43 1.02 1.06 0.297 
Joint ventures (-1,+1) 43 1.50*** 2.01 0.051 
R & D alliances (-5,+5) 271 2.91*** 3.38 0.001 
R & D alliances (-2,+2) 271 2.50*** 3.57 0.000 
R & D alliances (-1,+1) 271 2.80*** 4.53 0.000 
Licensing alliances (-5,+5) 226 -0.13 -0.17 0.866 
Licensing alliances (-2,+2) 226 0.40 0.59 0.556 
Licensing alliances (-1,+1) 226 1.02* 1.67 0.096 
Manufacturing alliances (-5,+5) 91 2.73*** 2.04 0.045 
Manufacturing alliances (-2,+2) 91 2.71*** 2.40 0.019 
Manufacturing alliances (-1,+1) 91 2.45** 2.43 0.017 
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Table 2.3: Wealth Effect of Radical Innovation and Spillover on Partners 
Panel A presents the wealth effect and spillover effect of FDA Orphan Drug (OD) approvals, which are from 
FDA Orphan Drug Product designation database (1983-2013). Panel B and C presents the wealth effect and 
spillover effect of NME innovators which are all U.S. pharmaceutical companies that received FDA NME 
drug approvals from 1980 to 2013. The alliance sample includes all strategic alliance partners among U.S. 
public firms in the same time period.  
 
Panel A. Wealth Effect and Spillover Effect of FDA OD Approvals 
 
Type of innovators and alliances Event window N Mean CARs T Statistics P Value 
All OD Innovators (-5,+5) 174 2.79*** 3.42 0.001 
All OD Innovators (-2,+2) 174 2.23*** 3.38 0.001 
All OD Innovators (-1,+1) 174 2.81*** 4.07 0.000 
OD Innovators with alliances (-5,+5) 97 2.00** 2.26 0.026 
OD Innovators with alliances (-2,+2) 97 1.80*** 2.72 0.008 
OD Innovators with alliances (-1,+1) 97 2.39*** 3.17 0.002 
All alliance partners (-5,+5) 97 2.34** 2.16 0.033 
All alliance partners (-2,+2) 97 1.79** 1.81 0.073 
All alliance partners (-1,+1) 97 1.56 1.50 0.137 
Horizontal alliances (-5,+5) 87 3.79*** 2.50 0.014 
Horizontal alliances (-2,+2) 87 2.79** 2.28 0.025 
Horizontal alliances (-1,+1) 87 1.88 1.54 0.127 
 
Panel B. Wealth Effect of FDA NME Approvals before Deleting Confounding Effects 
 
Type of innovators and alliances Event window N Mean CARs T Statistics P Value 
All NME Innovators (-5,+5) 388 4.43** 2.27 0.024 
All NME Innovators (-2,+2) 388 4.37** 2.38 0.018 
All NME Innovators (-1,+1) 388 4.14** 2.29 0.023 
NME Innovators with alliances (-5,+5) 135 3.69** 1.99 0.049 
NME Innovators with alliances (-2,+2) 135 3.89* 1.74 0.083 
NME Innovators with alliances (-1,+1) 135 3.76* 1.67 0.097 
All alliance partners (-5,+5) 135 0.94 1.58 0.117 
All alliance partners (-2,+2) 135 0.47 1.01 0.312 
All alliance partners (-1,+1) 135 0.32 0.86 0.390 
Horizontal alliances (-5,+5) 121 0.98 1.42 0.158 
Horizontal alliances (-2,+2) 121 0.18 0.35 0.729 
Horizontal alliances (-1,+1) 121 0.15 0.37 0.712 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Panel C. Wealth Effect of FDA NME Approvals after Deleting Confounding Effects 
 
Type of innovators and alliances Event window N Mean CARs T Statistics P Value 
All NME Innovators (-5,+5) 380 4.57** 2.30 0.022 
All NME Innovators (-2,+2) 380 4.49** 2.39 0.017 
All NME Innovators (-1,+1) 380 4.30** 2.33 0.021 
NME Innovators with alliances (-5,+5) 113 2.28*** 3.27 0.001 
NME Innovators with alliances (-2,+2) 113 1.91*** 3.30 0.001 
NME Innovators with alliances (-1,+1) 113 1.74*** 4.85 0.000 
All alliance partners (-5,+5) 113 0.83 1.06 0.293 
All alliance partners (-2,+2) 113 0.17 0.32 0.752 
All alliance partners (-1,+1) 113 0.17 0.43 0.671 
Horizontal alliances (-5,+5) 102 1.01 1.10 0.274 
Horizontal alliances (-2,+2) 102 0.09 0.15 0.883 
Horizontal alliances (-1,+1) 102 0.16 0.35 0.728 
 
Panel D. Wealth Effect of FDA NME Approvals (News Report Dates) 
 
Type of innovators and alliances Event window N Mean CARs T Statistics P Value 
NME Innovators with alliances (-5,+5) 124 3.67* 1.82 0.072 
NME Innovators with alliances (-2,+2) 124 3.79 1.57 0.119 
NME Innovators with alliances (-1,+1) 124 3.67 1.50 0.137 
All alliance partners (-5,+5) 124 1.25*** 2.54 0.012 
All alliance partners (-2,+2) 124 0.90*** 2.82 0.006 
All alliance partners (-1,+1) 124 0.52** 1.95 0.053 
Horizontal alliances (-5,+5) 96 1.30** 2.04 0.044 
Horizontal alliances (-2,+2) 96 0.82* 1.87 0.065 
Horizontal alliances (-1,+1) 96 0.62* 1.77 0.080 
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Table 2.4: Wealth Effect of Breakthrough Innovation and Spillover on Partners 
 
The breakthrough innovation sample includes all FDA Original New Drug Approvals (NDAs and BLAs) 
approvals from 1990 to 2013; the alliance sample includes all strategic alliances partners among U.S. public 
firms in the same time period.  
 
Type of innovators and alliances Event window N Mean CARs T Statistics P Value 
All NDA innovators (-5,+5) 969 1.71*** 2.56 0.011 
All NDA innovators (-2,+2) 969 1.64*** 2.56 0.011 
All NDA innovators (-1,+1) 969 1.23*** 5.05 0.000 
NDA Innovators with alliances (-5,+5) 384 1.44*** 3.35 0.001 
NDA Innovators with alliances (-2,+2) 384 1.10*** 3.87 0.000 
NDA Innovators with alliances (-1,+1) 384 1.14*** 4.09 0.000 
All alliance partners (-5,+5) 384 0.91* 1.79 0.075 
All alliance partners (-2,+2) 384 0.61* 1.67 0.096 
All alliance partners (-1,+1) 384 0.62* 1.85 0.066 
Horizontal alliances (-5,+5) 175 0.82 1.15 0.252 
Horizontal alliances (-2,+2) 175 0.22 0.56 0.573 
Horizontal alliances (-1,+1) 175 0.26 0.94 0.351 
 
Table 2.5: Wealth Effect of Incremental Innovation and Spillover on Partners 
 
The incremental innovation sample includes all FDA Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) approvals 
from 1990 to 2013; the alliance sample includes all strategic alliances partners among U.S. public firms in the 
same time period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of innovators and alliances Event window N Mean CARs T Statistics P Value 
All ANDA innovators (-5,+5) 3268 0.73*** 3.14 0.002 
All ANDA innovators (-2,+2) 3268 0.82*** 3.96 0.000 
All ANDA innovators (-1,+1) 3268 0.56*** 5.69 0.000 
ANDA Innovators with alliances (-5,+5) 1160 0.59*** 2.58 0.010 
ANDA Innovators with alliances (-2,+2) 1160 0.50*** 3.32 0.001 
ANDA Innovators with alliances (-1,+1) 1160 0.38*** 2.83 0.005 
All alliance partners (-5,+5) 1160 -0.07 -0.30 0.765 
All alliance partners (-2,+2) 1160 0.05 0.31 0.757 
All alliance partners (-1,+1) 1160 0.02 0.19 0.852 
Horizontal alliances (-5,+5) 2300 -0.26 -1.10 0.271 
Horizontal alliances (-2,+2) 2300 -0.08 -0.46 0.647 
Horizontal alliances (-1,+1) 2300 -0.01 -0.11 0.914 
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Table 2.6: Wealth Loss of FDA Warning Letters and Spillover on Partners 
 
The sample of FDA warned firms includes all U.S. pharmaceutical firms getting FDA warning letters from 
1997 to 2013; the alliance sample includes all strategic alliances partners among U.S. public firms in the same 
time period.  
 
Panel A. Alliance Partners as Portfolios Formed By Firms Getting Warning Letters 
 
Type of innovators and alliances Event window N Mean CARs T Statistics P Value 
All FDA warned firms (-5,+5) 462 -0.83 -1.47 0.143 
All FDA warned firms (-2,+2) 462 -0.59** -1.98 0.048 
All FDA warned firms (-1,+1) 462 -0.43* -1.79 0.075 
FDA warned firms with alliances (-5,+5) 222 -1.42*** -2.48 0.014 
FDA warned firms with alliances (-2,+2) 222 -0.84** -2.09 0.037 
FDA warned firms with alliances (-1,+1) 222 -0.48 -1.55 0.121 
All alliance partners (-5,+5) 222 -0.96 -1.60 0.110 
All alliance partners (-2,+2) 222 -0.74** -1.94 0.053 
All alliance partners (-1,+1) 222 -0.46* -1.68 0.094 
Horizontal alliances (-5,+5) 193 -1.52* -1.79 0.075 
Horizontal alliances (-2,+2) 193 -0.83 -1.53 0.127 
Horizontal alliances (-1,+1) 193 -0.62 -1.45 0.150 
 
 
Panel B. Alliance Partners Cross-Sectional Mean 
 
Type of innovators and alliances Event window N Mean CARs T Statistics P Value 
All FDA warned firms (-5,+5) 462 -0.83 -1.47 0.143 
All FDA warned firms (-2,+2) 462 -0.59** -1.98 0.048 
All FDA warned firms (-1,+1) 462 -0.43* -1.79 0.075 
FDA warned firms with alliances (-5,+5) 222 -1.42*** -2.48 0.014 
FDA warned firms with alliances (-2,+2) 222 -0.84** -2.09 0.037 
FDA warned firms with alliances (-1,+1) 222 -0.48 -1.55 0.121 
All alliance partners (-5,+5) 1315 -0.84*** -2.16 0.031 
All alliance partners (-2,+2) 1315 -0.72*** -2.80 0.005 
All alliance partners (-1,+1) 1315 -0.42** -2.12 0.034 
Horizontal alliances (-5,+5) 1009 -0.88* -1.95 0.051 
Horizontal alliances (-2,+2) 1009 -0.59** -1.97 0.049 
Horizontal alliances (-1,+1) 1009 -0.35 -1.50 0.134 
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Table 2.7: Wealth Loss of NME Drug Withdrawals and Spillover on Partners 
 
The sample of NME drug withdrawn firms includes all U.S. pharmaceutical firms that withdrew NME drugs 
from 1990 to 2013; the dates for drug withdrawals are collected from Wall Street Journal (37 cases) and New 
York Times (2 cases); the alliance sample includes all strategic alliances partners among U.S. public firms in 
the same time period.  
 
Panel A. Alliance Partners as Portfolios Formed by Firms Withdrew NME Drugs 
 
Type of innovators and alliances Event window N Mean CARs T Statistics P Value 
All NME drug withdrawn firms (-5,+5) 39 -10.80*** -2.91 0.006 
All NME drug withdrawn firms (-2,+2) 39 -8.96*** -3.35 0.002 
All NME drug withdrawn firms (-1,+1) 39 -9.27*** -3.46 0.001 
NME drug withdrawn firms with alliances (-5,+5) 18 -2.39 -1.70 0.107 
NME drug withdrawn firms with alliances (-2,+2) 18 -4.09** -2.67 0.016 
NME drug withdrawn firms with alliances (-1,+1) 18 -3.69** -2.51 0.022 
All alliance partners (-5,+5) 18 -1.74 -0.84 0.414 
All alliance partners (-2,+2) 18 -0.51 -0.47 0.641 
All alliance partners (-1,+1) 18 -0.41 -0.48 0.641 
Horizontal alliances (-5,+5) 17 -2.75 -1.42 0.174 
Horizontal alliances (-2,+2) 17 -0.59 -0.55 0.590 
Horizontal alliances (-1,+1) 17 0.01 0.01 0.994 
 
Panel B. Alliance Partners Cross-Sectional Mean 
 
Type of innovators and alliances Event window N Mean CARs T Statistics P Value 
All NME drug withdrawn firms (-5,+5) 39 -10.80*** -2.91 0.006 
All NME drug withdrawn firms (-2,+2) 39 -8.96*** -3.35 0.002 
All NME drug withdrawn firms (-1,+1) 39 -9.27*** -3.46 0.001 
NME drug withdrawn firms with alliances (-5,+5) 18 -2.39 -1.70 0.107 
NME drug withdrawn firms with alliances (-2,+2) 18 -4.09** -2.67 0.016 
NME drug withdrawn firms with alliances (-1,+1) 18 -3.69** -2.51 0.022 
All alliance partners (-5,+5) 114 -1.47 -0.95 0.344 
All alliance partners (-2,+2) 114 -0.38 -0.32 0.751 
All alliance partners (-1,+1) 114 -1.01 -1.09 0.278 
Horizontal alliances (-5,+5) 87 -1.58 -1.02 0.309 
Horizontal alliances (-2,+2) 87 -0.96 -0.99 0.326 
Horizontal alliances (-1,+1) 87 -1.37* -1.71 0.092 
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Table 2.8: Tests for Anticipation/Leakage and Reversal for Orphan Drug Announcements 
 
FDA Orphan Drug (OD) approvals ((radical innovation sample)) are from the FDA Orphan Drug Product designation database (1983-2013). Panel A 
is for all OD innovators and Panel B is for all OD innovators with at least one alliance partner. The alliance partners are identified based on the alliance 
sample including all strategic alliances partners among U.S. public firms in the same time period.  
 
 Panel A. For All OD Innovators 
  
Time 
period 
Number 
of events 
in the 
portfolio 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Raw Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Standardized 
Abnormal 
Return 
Percent of 
positive 
abnormal 
returns 
Sign-test 
statistic 
Patell's 
t-stat 
Cross-
sectional 
t-stat 
Boehmer's 
et al. (1991) 
t-stat 
(-1,+1)  164 3.30% 2.73% 0.582 0.659 4.061 7.456 4.374 4.351 
(-10,-2) 164 2.02% 0.80% 0.114 0.506 0.156 1.457 1.271 1.379 
(-20,-2)  164 3.43% 0.55% 0.090 0.506 0.156 1.154 0.547 1.096 
(-30,-2)  164 5.54% 1.08% 0.138 0.518 0.469 1.762 0.955 1.777 
(-60,-2)  164 7.69% 0.05% 0.103 0.506 0.156 1.315 0.029 1.294 
(-90,-2)  164 10.70% 0.53% 0.109 0.524 0.625 1.393 0.261 1.277 
(-120,-2)  162 16.00% 3.74% 0.119 0.512 0.312 1.509 1.545 1.272 
(-20,-11) 164 1.29% -0.18% 0.027 0.488 -0.312 0.341 -0.266 0.348 
(-60,-11) 164 5.79% -0.67% 0.066 0.445 -1.406 0.844 -0.442 0.793 
                   
(2,10)  164 0.26% -0.80% -0.037 0.470 -0.781 -0.478 -1.365 -0.484 
(2,30)  163 1.69% -1.75% -0.063 0.442 -1.488 -0.807 -1.666 -0.678 
(2,60)  162 3.92% -2.57% -0.041 0.475 -0.629 -0.520 -1.669 -0.408 
(2,90)  159 4.10% -5.43% -0.116 0.459 -1.031 -1.460 -2.683 -1.146 
(2, 120)  158 9.01% -5.05% -0.065 0.462 -0.955 -0.818 -1.974 -0.603 
(31,60)  162 2.42% -1.44% -0.033 0.488 -0.314 -0.416 -1.321 -0.358 
(61,90)  158 0.61% -3.59% -0.203 0.424 -1.909 -2.550 -3.120 -2.401 
(91, 120)  157 4.80% 0.30% 0.006 0.522 0.559 0.073 0.266 0.066 
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Panel B. For OD Innovators With Partners 
 
Time 
period 
Number 
of events 
in the 
portfolio 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Raw Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Standardized 
Abnormal 
Return 
Percent of 
positive 
abnormal 
returns 
Sign-test 
statistic 
Patell's 
t-stat 
Cross-
sectional 
t-stat 
Boehmer's 
et al. (1991) 
t-stat 
(-1,+1)  94 3.00% 2.30% 0.372 0.638 2.682 3.606 3.064 3.137 
(-10,-2) 94 1.69% 0.87% 0.058 0.479 -0.413 0.561 0.974 0.519 
(-20,-2)  94 3.83% 1.48% 0.101 0.532 0.619 0.977 0.959 0.848 
(-30,-2)  94 6.22% 2.56% 0.180 0.511 0.206 1.748 1.584 1.701 
(-60,-2)  94 8.85% 1.84% 0.155 0.521 0.413 1.502 0.936 1.435 
(-90,-2)  94 10.30% 1.12% 0.116 0.532 0.619 1.126 0.402 0.983 
(-120,-2)  93 16.60% 6.75% 0.205 0.521 0.413 1.978 2.150 1.547 
(-20,-11) 94 1.90% 0.58% 0.083 0.511 0.206 0.809 0.572 0.785 
(-60,-11) 94 7.11% 1.07% 0.141 0.436 -1.238 1.365 0.606 1.274 
                   
(2,10)  94 -0.15% -0.72% -0.033 0.479 -0.413 -0.322 -0.960 -0.335 
(2,30)  94 1.04% -1.20% 0.005 0.489 -0.206 0.044 -1.125 0.041 
(2,60)  93 3.86% -1.62% 0.078 0.505 0.104 0.752 -0.861 0.578 
(2,90)  92 3.55% -4.96% -0.022 0.489 -0.209 -0.214 -2.059 -0.170 
(2, 120)  92 6.85% -4.90% -0.007 0.500 0.000 -0.070 -1.638 -0.054 
(31,60)  93 2.98% -1.25% 0.057 0.505 0.104 0.546 -0.862 0.432 
(61,90)  91 0.15% -4.16% -0.203 0.462 -0.734 -1.935 -2.815 -1.848 
(91, 120)  91 4.04% -0.07% -0.080 0.505 0.105 -0.762 -0.048 -0.692 
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Table 2.9: Tests for Anticipation/Leakage and Reversal for NME Drug Announcements 
 
The NME innovators ((radical innovation sample)) are all U.S. pharmaceutical companies that received FDA NME drug approvals from 
1980 to 2013. Panel A is for all NME innovators and Panel B is for all NME innovators with at least one alliance partner. The alliance 
partners are identified based on the alliance sample including all strategic alliances partners among U.S. public firms in the same time period.  
 
Panel A. For All NME innovators 
 
Time 
period 
Number 
of events 
in the 
portfolio 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Raw Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Standardized 
Abnormal 
Return 
Percent of 
positive 
abnormal 
returns 
Sign-test 
statistic 
Patell's 
t-stat 
Cross-
sectional 
t-stat 
Boehmer's 
et al. (1991) 
t-stat 
(-1,+1)  359 4.87% 4.41% 0.724 0.641 5.331 13.713 2.258 3.585 
(-10,-2) 359 1.76% 0.77% 0.066 0.540 1.531 1.241 2.307 1.232 
(-20,-2)  359 3.31% 0.99% 0.053 0.532 1.214 0.998 1.890 0.973 
(-30,-2)  359 3.83% 0.52% 0.028 0.490 -0.369 0.532 0.804 0.480 
(-60,-2)  359 7.19% 1.50% 0.078 0.518 0.686 1.478 1.458 1.336 
(-90,-2)  356 10.40% 3.30% 0.155 0.565 2.481 2.932 2.425 2.422 
(-120,-2)  353 12.10% 1.44% 0.101 0.507 0.264 1.901 0.790 1.474 
(-20,-11) 359 1.47% 0.24% 0.016 0.487 -0.475 0.305 0.706 0.312 
(-60,-11) 359 5.30% 0.68% 0.050 0.501 0.053 0.949 0.748 0.905 
          
(2,10)  359 0.35% -0.55% -0.032 0.448 -1.953 -0.601 -1.232 -0.555 
(2,30)  359 2.02% -1.16% -0.103 0.460 -1.531 -1.953 -1.523 -1.771 
(2,60)  358 3.71% -2.44% -0.139 0.453 -1.797 -2.634 -2.147 -2.223 
(2,90)  356 5.52% -3.36% -0.152 0.444 -2.120 -2.865 -2.468 -2.400 
(2, 120)  355 7.67% -4.76% -0.170 0.439 -2.282 -3.209 -2.669 -2.587 
(31,60)  357 1.61% -2.08% -0.117 0.448 -1.958 -2.206 -2.527 -1.861 
(61,90)  351 1.90% -1.76% -0.094 0.444 -2.082 -1.755 -2.225 -1.601 
(91, 120)  349 1.69% -2.07% -0.102 0.481 -0.696 -1.907 -2.255 -1.756 
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Panel B. For NME Innovators With Partners 
 
Time 
period 
Number 
of events 
in the 
portfolio 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Raw Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Standardized 
Abnormal 
Return 
Percent 
of 
positive 
abnormal 
returns 
Sign-test 
statistic 
Patell's 
t-stat 
Cross-
sectional 
t-stat 
Boehmer's 
et al. (1991) 
t-stat 
(-1,+1)  110 2.10% 1.87% 0.503 0.664 3.432 5.278 4.662 5.624 
(-10,-2) 110 1.18% 0.62% 0.111 0.582 1.716 1.168 1.063 1.114 
(-20,-2)  110 1.90% 0.23% -0.017 0.491 -0.191 -0.180 0.290 -0.171 
(-30,-2)  110 2.82% -0.36% -0.041 0.482 -0.381 -0.425 -0.361 -0.378 
(-60,-2)  110 6.78% 1.45% 0.089 0.536 0.763 0.937 0.967 0.874 
(-90,-2)  110 10.30% 4.06% 0.246 0.573 1.526 2.585 2.348 2.307 
(-120,-2)  110 9.75% 1.10% 0.114 0.509 0.191 1.197 0.454 0.953 
(-20,-11) 110 0.69% -0.34% -0.115 0.427 -1.526 -1.207 -0.718 -1.331 
(-60,-11) 110 5.49% 0.86% 0.046 0.527 0.572 0.486 0.671 0.491 
                   
(2,10)  110 0.77% 0.58% 0.022 0.464 -0.763 0.232 1.078 0.211 
(2,30)  110 0.83% -1.21% -0.179 0.482 -0.381 -1.874 -1.212 -1.640 
(2,60)  110 1.84% -2.97% -0.254 0.400 -2.098 -2.662 -2.138 -2.436 
(2,90)  109 3.71% -3.82% -0.234 0.404 -2.011 -2.447 -2.050 -2.173 
(2, 120)  109 4.94% -4.52% -0.228 0.431 -1.437 -2.385 -1.760 -2.030 
(31,60)  110 1.42% -2.52% -0.228 0.391 -2.288 -2.387 -2.395 -2.199 
(61,90)  109 2.05% -1.26% -0.056 0.459 -0.862 -0.580 -1.143 -0.548 
(91, 120)  109 1.13% -1.10% -0.073 0.468 -0.670 -0.758 -0.952 -0.745 
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Table 2.10: Tests for Anticipation/Leakage and Reversal for NDA Drug Announcements 
 
The NDA Drug Announcements (breakthrough innovation sample) includes all FDA Original New Drug Approvals (NDAs and BLAs) approvals from 
1990 to 2013. 
 
Time 
period 
Number of 
events in the 
portfolio 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Raw Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Standardized 
Abnormal 
Return 
Percent of 
positive 
abnormal 
returns 
Sign-test 
statistic 
Patell's 
t-stat 
Cross-
sectional 
t-stat 
Boehmer's 
et al. (1991) 
t-stat 
(-1,+1)  928 1.50% 1.21% 0.279 0.556 3.414 8.501 5.020 6.149 
(-10,-2) 928 1.34% 0.66% 0.032 0.499 -0.066 0.962 1.041 0.719 
(-20,-2)  928 2.39% 0.70% 0.028 0.499 -0.066 0.858 1.046 0.715 
(-30,-2)  928 3.26% 0.73% 0.023 0.508 0.460 0.690 1.062 0.583 
(-60,-2)  928 5.22% 0.36% 0.012 0.489 -0.657 0.374 0.430 0.328 
(-90,-2)  927 7.64% 0.40% 0.023 0.497 -0.197 0.709 0.393 0.609 
(-120,-2)  923 9.82% 1.32% -0.011 0.485 -0.919 -0.331 0.666 -0.243 
(-20,-11) 928 1.04% 0.05% 0.010 0.484 -0.985 0.314 0.215 0.315 
(-60,-11) 928 4.13% -0.28% -0.006 0.481 -1.182 -0.186 -0.494 -0.177 
                    
(2,10)  926 0.73% 0.02% 0.023 0.496 -0.263 0.690 0.079 0.697 
(2,30)  922 1.35% -0.98% -0.083 0.478 -1.317 -2.527 -2.411 -2.387 
(2,60)  918 3.40% -1.64% -0.077 0.455 -2.706 -2.344 -2.585 -2.041 
(2,90)  916 5.32% -2.50% -0.090 0.473 -1.652 -2.732 -2.965 -2.299 
(2, 120)  909 7.87% -2.69% -0.060 0.483 -1.028 -1.816 -2.477 -1.452 
(31,60)  913 2.04% -0.98% -0.034 0.460 -2.416 -1.039 -2.185 -0.957 
(61,90)  906 1.68% -0.99% -0.055 0.466 -2.060 -1.661 -2.225 -1.507 
(91, 120)  893 2.42% -0.35% 0.011 0.502 0.100 0.318 -0.720 0.273 
 
 
93 
 
  Table 2.11: Tests for Anticipation/Leakage and Reversal for FDA Warnings 
 
  The sample of FDA warned firms includes all U.S. pharmaceutical firms getting FDA warning letters from 1997 to 2013. 
 
Time 
period 
Number 
of events 
in the 
portfolio 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Raw Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Standardized 
Abnormal 
Return 
Percent of 
positive 
abnormal 
returns 
Sign-test 
statistic 
Patell's 
t-stat 
Cross-
sectional 
t-stat 
Boehmer's 
et al. 
(1991) t-
stat 
(-1,+1)  462 -0.17% -0.38% -0.077 0.461 -1.675 -1.661 -1.602 -1.475 
(-10,-2) 462 0.59% 0.09% -0.044 0.498 -0.093 -0.935 0.239 -0.895 
(-20,-2)  462 1.52% -0.29% -0.082 0.478 -0.930 -1.759 -0.468 -1.536 
(-30,-2)  462 1.22% -1.53% -0.151 0.422 -3.350 -3.244 -2.020 -2.801 
(-60,-2)  461 4.22% -1.29% -0.120 0.472 -1.210 -2.587 -1.141 -2.206 
(-90,-2)  458 8.11% -1.00% -0.067 0.476 -1.024 -1.441 -0.682 -1.200 
(-120,-2)  458 10.70% -0.22% 0.016 0.489 -0.465 0.349 -0.117 0.289 
(-20,-11) 462 0.99% -0.35% -0.067 0.470 -1.303 -1.449 -0.691 -1.246 
(-60,-11) 461 3.75% -1.37% -0.114 0.461 -1.675 -2.450 -1.322 -2.164 
          
(2,10)  462 0.12% -0.40% -0.050 0.444 -2.419 -1.083 -0.892 -0.965 
(2,30)  462 1.49% -0.27% -0.057 0.481 -0.837 -1.228 -0.348 -1.163 
(2,60)  462 2.31% -0.38% -0.042 0.474 -1.117 -0.893 -0.344 -0.827 
(2,90)  462 2.57% -1.23% -0.068 0.476 -1.024 -1.469 -0.875 -1.328 
(2, 120)  462 5.36% -1.63% -0.100 0.461 -1.675 -2.157 -0.930 -1.901 
(31,60)  457 1.02% -0.12% 0.015 0.505 0.234 0.316 -0.177 0.299 
(61,90)  455 0.48% -0.44% -0.032 0.488 -0.516 -0.686 -0.607 -0.637 
(91, 120)  453 2.98% -0.10% -0.029 0.490 -0.423 -0.613 -0.142 -0.593 
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  Table 2.12: Tests for Anticipation/Leakage and Reversal for NME withdrawals 
 
 The sample of NME drug withdrawn firms includes all U.S. pharmaceutical firms withdrew NME drug from 1990 to 2013; the dates for drug    
withdrawals are collected from Wall Street Journal and New York Times. 
 
Time 
period 
Number 
of events 
in the 
portfolio 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Raw Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Standardized 
Abnormal 
Return 
Percent 
of 
positive 
abnormal 
returns 
Sign-
test 
statistic 
Patell's t-
stat 
Cross-
sectional 
t-stat 
Boehmer's 
et al. (1991) 
t-stat 
(-1,+1)  34 -10.80% -10.70% -3.038 0.118 -4.459 -17.712 -3.556 -3.744 
(-10,-2) 34 -1.47% -1.31% -0.289 0.471 -0.343 -1.686 -0.575 -0.778 
(-20,-2)  34 -1.37% -1.43% -0.190 0.471 -0.343 -1.108 -0.571 -0.692 
(-30,-2)  34 -0.61% -0.30% 0.011 0.412 -1.029 0.064 -0.080 0.025 
(-60,-2)  34 2.60% 2.34% 0.388 0.500 0.000 2.260 0.489 0.808 
(-90,-2)  34 -1.78% -5.70% 0.123 0.353 -1.715 0.717 -0.926 0.219 
(-120,-2)  34 -2.99% -12.20% 0.012 0.324 -2.058 0.067 -2.167 0.017 
(-20,-11) 34 0.39% 0.00% -0.034 0.500 0.000 -0.198 0.003 -0.152 
(-60,-11) 34 4.24% 3.92% 0.505 0.559 0.686 2.946 0.953 1.154 
          
(2,10)  34 -1.60% -0.90% -0.016 0.471 -0.343 -0.093 -0.732 -0.083 
(2,30)  34 0.24% 1.77% -0.048 0.559 0.686 -0.280 0.621 -0.165 
(2,60)  33 0.64% 3.11% 0.010 0.485 -0.174 0.056 0.604 0.033 
(2,90)  33 1.12% 4.60% 0.006 0.485 -0.174 0.033 0.766 0.020 
(2, 120)  33 7.75% 11.50% 0.233 0.636 1.567 1.340 1.646 0.945 
(31,60)  33 0.73% 2.86% 0.121 0.485 -0.174 0.695 0.786 0.702 
(61,90)  32 0.82% 2.35% 0.135 0.438 -0.707 0.766 0.725 0.859 
(91, 120)  31 7.76% 6.92% 0.322 0.548 0.539 1.791 2.351 1.416 
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Table 2.13: Innovator Announcements CARs Cross-sectional Analysis 
 
The sample includes announcements events for radical innovations (FDA Orphan Drug approvals and FDA 
NME drug approvals), and breakthrough innovations (FDA Original New Drug Approvals). The alliance 
sample includes strategic alliances partners among U.S. firms in the same time period. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 2.A: Variable definitions. Panel A is the descriptive statistics and Panel B presents the 
cross-sectional regression analysis of the innovator’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) during the three-day 
event window (Innovator CAR (3-day)). T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
Innovator CAR (3-day) (%) 903 1.506*** 5.940 -10.11 34.22 
Radical innovation 903 0.313 0.464 0 1 
Radical Innovation 1 (OD drug)  903 0.111 0.314 0 1 
Radical Innovation 2 (NME drug) 903 0.203 0.402 0 1 
Tobin’s Q 877 2.818 2.130 0.23 10.78 
Innovator size 897 8.251 2.259 2.24 11.67 
Firm age 903 21.770 14.170 1 50 
Log(Firm age) 903 2.742 0.966 0 3.91 
IPO innovator 903 0.163 0.369 0 1 
Allied innovator 903 0.869 0.337 0 1 
Allied*Radical innovation  903 0.288 0.453 0 1 
Single alliance innovator 903 0.059 0.235 0 1 
Total alliances pre-event  903 2.279 1.051 0 3 
JV only 903 0.020 0.140 0 1 
Joint venture  903 0.523 0.500 0 1 
Alliance duration  903 1.245 1.331 0 3 
Public only  903 0.785 0.411 0 1 
Manufacturing agreement  903 0.578 0.494 0 1 
Marketing agreement  903 0.802 0.399 0 1 
R&D agreement 903 0.739 0.440 0 1 
Log(Horizontal allies) 903 1.960 1.463 0 6.18 
Log(Total alliances) 903 2.315 1.466 0 6.85 
Log(Strategic alliances) 903 2.213 1.465 0 6.70 
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Panel B. Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of the Innovator’s Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Variables icar3 icar3 icar3 icar3 icar3 icar3 icar3 icar3 icar3 icar3 icar3 
            
Radical innovation 0.85** 0.78* 0.86** 0.76* 5.01*** 1.03**      
 (2.03) (1.86) (2.05) (1.79) (3.20) (2.39)      
Radical Innovation 1 (OD drug)        1.00 1.04 0.91 1.09* 1.05 
       (1.55) (1.62) (1.42) (1.72) (1.63) 
Radical Innovation 2 (NME drug)       0.95* 1.01** 0.91* 1.08** 1.05** 
       (1.86) (1.98) (1.79) (2.14) (2.04) 
IPO innovator     1.60*** 1.20** 1.50*** 1.10* 1.45** 0.44 1.13* 
     (2.73) (2.08) (2.64) (1.88) (2.56) (0.74) (1.88) 
Innovator size -0.65*** -0.70*** -0.63*** -0.72***        
 (-7.12) (-7.14) (-6.97) (-7.51)        
Tobin’s Q -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 
 (-0.90) (-1.12) (-0.97) (-1.20) (0.60) (0.72) (0.55) (0.83) (0.80) (0.81) (0.78) 
R&D agreement -0.91*           
 (-1.95)           
Log(Horizontal allies)  -0.03          
  (-0.18)          
Joint venture    -1.18***         
   (-2.92)         
Allied innovator    0.17 -0.41       
    (0.27) (-0.57)       
Allied*Radical innovation     -4.36***       
     (-2.67)       
Log(Strategic alliances)      -0.53***      
      (-3.46)      
Single alliance innovator      -1.51*      
      (-1.71)      
Public only         -1.00*     
       (-1.95)     
Log(Total alliances)        -0.48***    
        (-3.26)    
Manufacturing agreement          -0.97**   
         (-2.27)   
Marketing agreement          -3.06***  
          (-5.54)  
Alliance duration            -0.09 
           (-0.57) 
Total alliances pre-event            -0.55** 
           (-2.48) 
Constant 7.59*** 7.44*** 7.38*** 7.42*** 1.20 2.10*** 1.64*** 1.96*** 1.37*** 3.39*** 2.20*** 
 (8.91) (8.62) (8.71) (8.48) (1.59) (4.12) (2.97) (3.89) (3.14) (5.78) (3.54) 
            
Observations 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 
Adjusted R2 0.0745 0.0705 0.0795 0.0706 0.0239 0.0262 0.0162 0.0238 0.0178 0.0456 0.0192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
Table 2.14: Partner Announcements CARs Cross-sectional Analysis 
 
The sample includes announcements events for radical innovations (FDA Orphan Drug approvals and FDA 
NME drug approvals), and breakthrough innovations (FDA Original New Drug Approvals). The alliance 
sample includes strategic alliances partners among U.S. public firms in the same time period. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 2.A: Variable definitions. Panel A is the descriptive statistics and Panel B presents the 
cross-sectional regression analysis of the average partners’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during the 
three-day event window.  T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
Partner CAR (3-day) (%) 2,433 0.277*** 5.369 -13.20 18.40 
Partner Tobin's Q 2,433 2.532 2.073 0.14 11.53 
Partner size 2,433 6.195 2.544 2.01 11.82 
Log(Partner firm age) 2,433 2.508 0.822 0 3.91 
IPO partner 2,433 0.170 0.375 0 1 
Single alliance partner 2,433 0.225 0.418 0 1 
Innovator size 2,433 9.266 1.673 3.58 12.18 
Innovator Tobin's Q 2,433   3.249 2.136  0.35 9.94 
Radical Innovation 2,433 0.258 0.437 0 1 
Radical Innovation 1 (OD drug) 2,433 0.126 0.332 0 1 
Radical Innovation 2 (NME drug) 2,433 0.132 0.338 0 1 
Breakthrough Innovation (NDA drug) 2,433 0.742 0.437 0 1 
Innovator CAR (3-day) (%) 2,433 0.799 3.731 -7.29 16.88 
Log(Num ptn per innovator) 2,433 1.981 0.938 0 4.49 
Log(Alliance duration) 2,433 7.050 1.131 0.69 9.09 
Horizontal allies 2,433 0.681 0.466 0 1 
Strategic alliance  2,433 0.952 0.213 0 1 
Licensing agreement  2,433 0.323 0.468 0 1 
Manufacturing agreement  2,433 0.162 0.369 0 1 
R&D agreement 2,433 0.695 0.460 0 1 
Supply agreement  2,433 0.002 0.041 0 1 
Funding agreement  2,433 0.090 0.286 0 1 
Joint venture  2,433 0.048 0.213 0 1 
Marketing agreement  2,433 0.353 0.478 0 1 
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Panel B. Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of the Average Partners’ CARs  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables pmcar3 pmcar3 pmcar3 
    
Innovator CAR(3-day) 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.16*** 
 (10.64) (4.87) (10.51) 
Radical Innovation 1 (OD drug) 0.23   
 (1.36)   
Radical Innovation  -0.14 0.03 
  (-1.04) (0.22) 
Innovator CAR(3-day)*Radical  0.18***  
  (5.84)  
IPO partner  0.35** 0.28* 
  (2.34) (1.79) 
Partner Tobin’s Q 0.06** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (2.39) (2.77) (2.65) 
Log(Partner firm age) -0.23***   
 (-3.13)   
Innovator Tobin’s Q 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 
 (6.95) (7.55) (7.01) 
Innovator Size   -0.05 
   (-1.35) 
Relative Size 0.00   
 (0.85)   
Log(Num ptn per innovator) -0.15** -0.14** -0.11 
 (-2.40) (-2.32) (-1.55) 
Log(Alliance duration) -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.15*** 
 (-2.77) (-2.82) (-2.87) 
Strategic alliance 0.40   
 (1.52)   
Manufacturing agreement  0.14  
  (0.95)  
Funding agreement   0.22 
   (1.10) 
Single alliance partner   0.28** 
   (2.01) 
Constant 0.83* 0.55 0.97* 
 (1.84) (1.36) (1.87) 
    
Observations 2,433 2,433 2,433 
Adjusted R2 0.0797 0.0899 0.0788 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1.A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variables Definitions 
Acquirer size Log value of acquirer total assets ($ millions) 
Alliance-acquisition align Dummy variable indicating that targets have horizontal alliances and also the acquisitions are 
horizontal based on three-digit SIC code 
Alliance duration (in days) Number of days from the target’s alliance announcement to the acquisition announcement date 
Alliance duration Categorical variable that is transformed based on the number of years from the target’s alliance 
announcement to the acquisition announcement date: 0 if no alliance; 1 if alliances are within one 
year on average; 2 if alliances are within two year on average; 3 if alliances are within two to five years 
on average 
Allied firm Alliance indicator for IPOs or targets 
Allied IPO IPOs with alliances in 5 years prior to public offerings 
Allied*private Interaction term between allied target and private firm 
Allied target 
 
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the target makes at least one alliance in 5 years preceding 
the acquisition announcement, zero otherwise. 
Analyst coverage Logarithm of one plus the number of analysts covering the targets within one year prior to the 
acquisitions 
Brokerage acquisition Indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for acquisitions where acquirers and targets share 
common alliance partner, and zero otherwise 
Biotech Biotech industry category (100s) based on SDC special high-tech classification code 
Book value per share Book value per share from SDC 
Bubble  Indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the merger was announced during the stock market 
bubble period of 1999-2000, and zero otherwise 
Cash Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the acquisition is paid purely by cash, and zero otherwise. 
Cash-Asset Ratio of cash to total assets 
Computer equipment Computer equipment industry category (200s) based on SDC special high-tech classification code 
Communications Communications industry category (400s) based on SDC special high-tech classification code 
Cross Tech Transfer    Dummy variable indicating that the target makes at least one cross technology transfer agreement 
with their alliance partners in the last 5 years 
Diversifying Dummy variable indicating that the acquirers and the targets have different three-digit SIC codes 
Industry DER Industry long-term debt to market value of equity ratio by three-digit SIC code 
Earnout  Dummy variable indicating that the acquisition uses earnout contracts 
EBITDA Earnings before taxes plus amortization and depreciation 
Electronics Electronics industry category (300s) based on SDC special high-tech classification code 
Exploration agreement    Dummy variable indicating that the target makes at least one exploration agreement with their 
alliance partners in the last 5 years 
Funding agreement  Dummy variable indicating that the target makes at least one funding agreement with their alliance 
partners in the last 5 years 
High tech firm Indicator variables for high-tech targets or IPOs 
High tech IPO Dummy variable that equals one if the IPO is classified as high-tech, zero otherwise 
High tech target Dummy which takes the value 1 if the target is in the high-tech industry, and zero otherwise. 
Horizontal alliance  Dummy variable indicating that the target has at least one alliance partner that share the same 3-digit 
SIC code with the target 
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Horizontal merger Dummy variable indicating that the target and acquirer share the same 3-digit SIC code 
Hot IPO market A time-varying covariate defined as the monthly average change between the offer price and the 
closing bid price on the first day of aftermarket trading during 1990 to 2010, following Ritter (1984) 
IB-advisor Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the target hires any investment bank advisor, and zero 
otherwise. 
Industry NPM Industry net (after-tax) profit margin by three-digit SIC code 
Industry return Lagged six-month industry return by three-digit SIC code 
Insider Insider ownership after public offering  
Joint venture   Dummy variable indicating that the target makes at least one joint venture agreement with their 
alliance partners in the last 5 years 
JV only  Dummy variable indicating that the target makes at least one joint venture agreement and no strategic 
alliance with their alliance partners in the last 5 years 
Leverage Total debt scaled by total assets 
Licensing agreement  Dummy variable indicating that the target makes at least one licensing contract with their alliance 
partners in the last 5 years 
Liquidity Cash payments to selling insiders  
Log (Age) Logarithm of one plus the number of years since the target or IPO firms founded.  
Log (Assets) Log value of total assets 
Log(Cross Tech Transfer) Logarithm of one plus the number of cross tech transfer alliances the target or IPO makes in the last 
5 years 
Log(Horizontal alliances) 
 
Log(IPO market cap.) 
Logarithm of one plus the number of alliance partners in the last 5 years that share the same 3-digit 
SIC code with the target or IPO 
Logarithm of the IPO’s market capitalization at the end of its first day trading—the total number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price at the end of the first trading day. 
Log(Licensing agreements) Logarithm of one plus the number of licensing alliances the target or IPO makes in the last five years 
Log(Manufacturing 
agreements) 
Logarithm of one plus the number of manufacturing alliances the target or IPO makes in the last five 
years 
Log(Private only alliances) 
 
Log (Proceeds) 
Log(Public alliance partners) 
Logarithm of one plus the number of alliances with only private firm involved in the last five years 
Log value of the amount of IPO proceeds ($ millions) 
Logarithm of one plus the number of public alliance partners, where alliance partners’ public status is 
defined as both as of alliance announcement dates (based on SDC alliance data) and as of acquisition 
announcement dates (based on Compustat and CRSP data). 
Log(Public involved alliances) Logarithm of one plus the number of alliances with public firm involved in the last five years 
Log(R&D alliances) Logarithm of one plus the number of R&D alliances the target or IPO makes in the last five years 
Log(Strategic alliances) Logarithm of one plus the number of strategic alliances the target or IPO makes in the last five years 
Log(Total alliances) Logarithm of one plus the total number of alliances the target makes in the last five years 
Industry M/B   Industry average market to book ratio from CRSP & Compustat 
Manufacturing agreement  Dummy variable indicating that the target makes at least one manufacturing agreement with its 
alliance partners. 
Market return Lagged six-month CRSP market index return 
Non-horizontal ally Dummy variable indicating that the target has alliance partner that do not share the same 3-digit SIC 
code with the target  
Non-horizontal ally*diversify Interaction term between non-horizontal ally and diversifying acquisition, indicating that the target 
has alliance partner(s) that do not share the same 3-digit SIC code with the target, and the target later 
is acquired in a diversifying acquisition   
Offer price IPO offer price from SDC 
OPMAD-mean Industry operating profit margin after depreciation by three-digit SIC code 
Other high-tech Other high-tech industry category (500s) based on SDC special high-tech classification code 
Partner acquisition Dummy variable indicating that the target is acquired by its previous alliance partner 
Private only alliance  Dummy variable indicating that the target has at least one alliance with only private firm involved in 
the last fives 
Price book value Price book value from SDC 
Private involved alliances  Dummy variable indicating that the target has at least one alliance with private firm involved in the 
last 5 years 
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Private target  Dummy which takes the value 1 if the target is a private company, and zero otherwise. 
Proceeds 
Public alliance partner 
Amount of proceeds in the market ($ millions) from SDC 
Indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has at least one an alliance partner that is 
publicly listed both as of alliance announcement dates (based on SDC alliance data) and as of 
acquisition announcement dates (based on Compustat and CRSP data) 
Public Involved alliance  Dummy variable indicating that the target has at least one alliance with public firm involved in the 
last 5 years 
Public only alliance  Dummy variable indicating that the target has at least one alliance with only public firm involved in 
the last 5 years 
Public target  Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the target is a listed company, and zero otherwise. 
R&D alliance  Dummy variable indicating that the target makes at least one research and development contract with 
their alliance partners in the last 5 years 
Industry RDS Industry R&D intensity by three-digit SIC code 
Relative size Target total assets scaled by acquirers total assets (both from SDC) 
Partial adjustment Percentage difference from offer price to the midpoint of the file range  
ROA Return on total assets from SDC 
Industry ROA Industry return on average assets by three-digit SIC code 
Share Overhang  Pre-IPO shares retained for all classes divided by shares filed (including primary and secondary 
shares) 
Stock  Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the acquisition is paid purely by stock, and zero otherwise. 
Strategic alliance  Dummy variable indicating that the target makes at least one strategic alliance agreement with its 
alliance partners in the last 5 years 
Subsidiary involved alliance  Dummy variable indicating that the target has at least one alliance with one subsidiary firm involved 
in the last five years 
Subsidiary only alliance  Dummy variable indicating that the target has at least one alliance with only subsidiary firms involved 
in the last five years 
Supply agreement  Dummy variable indicating that the target makes at least one supply agreement with its alliance 
partners in the last 5 years 
Target premium Acquisition transaction value to sales ratio: the amount paid for the sell-out firm, divided by the sell-
out firm's sales in the year prior to the takeover announcement  
Target size Log value of target total assets ($ millions) 
Tech bubble High-tech targets that are acquired during the bubble period 
Tobin’s Q The Q of the target is based on the Chung and Pruitt (1994) estimation: Approximate q = (MV + PS 
+ DEBT) / TA, where: MV = the market value of equity; PS = the liquidating value of the firm's 
outstanding preferred stock; DEBT = the value of the firm's current liabilities minus current assets 
plus the book value of long-term debt; and TA = the book value of total assets of the firm 
Top tier underwriter Dummy variable for IPOs that were taken public by an investment bank with a Carter-Manaster 
ranking of 8 or above on a 1-9 point scale. 
Total alliances, 5 years Total number of alliances the target makes in the last five years 
Total alliances Categorical variable that measures the total number of alliances the target or IPO makes in the last 
five years: 0 if no alliance in last five years; 1 if one alliance partner; 2 if 2 to 5 alliance partners; 3 if 
more than five alliance partners 
Underpricing  Percentage change in price from the initial offer price to the first-day market price 
VC-backing Dummy variable if the target is backed by venture capital, and zero otherwise 
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APPENDIX 2.A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variables Definitions 
Allied innovator 
Breakthrough Innovation (NDA 
drug) 
Alliance indicator for innovators 
Dummy variable indicating that the innovation is a FDA Original New Drug (NDA) approval 
Cross Tech Transfer    Dummy variable indicating that the innovator makes at least one cross technology transfer 
agreement with their alliance partners in the past 
Exploration agreement    Dummy variable indicating that the innovator makes at least one exploration agreement with their 
alliance partners in the past 
Funding agreement  Dummy variable indicating that the innovator makes at least one funding agreement with their 
alliance partners in the past 
Horizontal alliance  Dummy variable indicating that the innovator has at least one alliance partner that share the same 
3-digit SIC code with the innovator 
Innovator size Log value of acquirer total assets ($ millions) 
Innovator CAR (3-day) Innovator’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) during the three-day event window 
Innovator CAR(3-day)*OD Interaction variable between Innovator CAR (3-day) and Radical Innovation 1 (OD drug) 
Innovator CAR(3-day)*NME Interaction variable between Innovator CAR (3-day) and Radical Innovation 2 (NME drug)  
Innovator CAR(3-day)*Radical Interaction variable between Innovator CAR (3-day) and Radical Innovation  
IPO innovator/partner Innovators or partners that have innovation events within five years after publicly listed based on 
Compustat and CRSP database 
Joint venture   Dummy variable indicating that the innovator makes at least one joint venture agreement with 
their alliance partners in the past 
JV only  Dummy variable indicating that the innovator makes at least one joint venture agreement and no 
strategic alliance with their alliance partners in the past 
Licensing agreement  Dummy variable indicating that the innovator makes at least one licensing contract with their 
alliance partners in the past 
Log(Alliance duration) Logarithm of the number of days from alliance formation to innovation event 
Log( Firm Age) Logarithm of one plus the number of years since the innovator firms listed on CRSP&Compustat.  
Log(Cross Tech Transfer) Logarithm of one plus the number of cross tech transfer alliances the innovator makes in the past 
Log(Horizontal alliances) Logarithm of one plus the number of alliance partners in the past that share the same 3-digit SIC 
code with the innovator. 
Log(Licensing agreements) Logarithm of one plus the number of licensing alliances the innovator makes in in the past 
Log(Manufacturing agreements) Logarithm of one plus the number of manufacturing alliances the innovator makes in in the past 
Log(Num ptn per innovator) Logarithm of the number of partners per innovator on one innovation event 
Log(R&D alliances) Logarithm of one plus the number of R&D alliances the innovator makes in in the past 
Log(Strategic alliances) Logarithm of one plus the number of strategic alliances the innovator makes in in the past 
Log(Total alliances) Logarithm of one plus the total number of alliances the innovator makes in in the past 
Manufacturing agreement Dummy variable indicating that the innovator makes at least one manufacturing agreement with its 
alliance partners. 
Partner CAR(3-day) Average partner cumulative abnormal return (CAR) during the three-day event window for each 
innovation event 
Radical Innovation Dummy variable indicating that the innovation is a FDA Orphan Drug (OD) or NME drug 
approval 
Radical Innovation 1 (OD drug) Dummy variable indicating that the innovation is a FDA Orphan Drug (OD) approval 
Radical Innovation 2 (NME drug) Dummy variable indicating that the innovation is a FDA NME drug approval 
R&D agreement Dummy variable indicating that the innovator makes at least one research and development 
contract with their alliance partners in the past 
Relative size 
 
Single alliance innovator 
Partner market equity capitalization scaled by innovator market equity capitalization (both from 
Compustat) at the end of the year of the innovation event 
Dummy variable indicating that an innovator have only one alliance partner 
Single alliance partner Dummy variable indicating that an alliance partner have only one innovator as partner 
Strategic alliance  Dummy variable indicating that the innovator makes at least one strategic alliance agreement with 
its alliance partners in the past 
Supply agreement  Dummy variable indicating that the innovator makes at least one supply agreement with its alliance 
partners in the past 
Innovator/Partner Tobin’s Q The Q of the innovator or Partner is based on the Chung and Pruitt (1994) estimation: 
Approximate q = (MV + PS + DEBT) / TA, where: MV = the market value of equity; PS = the 
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liquidating value of the firm's outstanding preferred stock; DEBT = the value of the firm's current 
liabilities minus current assets plus the book value of long-term debt; and TA = the book value of 
total assets of the firm 
Total alliances pre-event Categorical variable that measures the total number of alliances the innovator makes in the past: 0 
if no alliance in last five years; 1 if one alliance partner; 2 if 2 to 5 alliance partners; 3 if more than 
five alliance partners 
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APPENDIX 2.B: NDA APPROVALS BY THERAPEUTIC POTENTIAL AND 
CHEMICAL TYPE 
 
The following table gives a snapshot of the distribution of different types of NDA approvals. Source: FDA 
website: “NDA Approvals by Therapeutic Potential and Chemical Type” 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Drugan
dBiologicApprovalReports/ucm121102.htm 
 
Year 
Therapeutic Potential - Priority Review* 
and Chemical Type*** 
Therapeutic Potential - Standard Review** 
and Chemical Type*** 
Total Approvals 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
7 Total 
1990 12 0 8 0 0 0 0 20 11 2 23 2 2 4 0 44 64 
1991 14 0 5 0 0 0 0 19 16 1 15 2 10 0 0 44 63 
1992 11 0 5 0 1 0 0 17 15 1 30 5 21 1 1 74 91 
1993 13 0 6 0 0 0 0 19 12 0 18 1 18 2 0 51 70 
1994 13 0 4 0 0 - 0 17 9 0 23 5 8 - 0 45 62 
1995 9 1 5 0 0 - 0 15 19 5 30 2 11 - 0 67 82 
1996 18 0 10 0 1 - 0 29 35 5 50 4 7 - 1 102 131 
1997 9 1 6 1 3 - 0 20 30 2 52 12 4 - 1 101 121 
1998 16 0 9 0 0 - 0 25 14 0 46 4 0 - 1 65 90 
1999 19 1 7 1 0 - 0 28 16 2 32 3 2 - 0 55 83 
2000 9 1 9 1 0 - 0 20 18 0 48 7 3 - 2 78 98 
2001 7 1 1 0 1 - 0 10 17 1 23 9 5 - 1 56 66 
2002 7 0 3 1 0 - 0 11 10 2 44 5 6 - 0 67 78 
 2003 9 0 4 1 0 - 0  14 12 5 31 7 3 - 0  58  72 
 2004 17 0 4 1 3 - 0  25 14 1 59 5 8 - 1  88  113 
 
*Priority Review - Significant improvement compared to marketed products in the treatment, diagnosis, or 
prevention of a disease;  
**Standard Review - The drug appears to have therapeutic qualities similar to those of one or more already 
marketed drugs; 
***Chemical Types: 
     1 -   New molecular entity 
     2 -   New ester, new salt, or other noncovalent derivative 
     3 -   New formulation 
     4 -   New combination 
     5 -   New manufacturer 
     6 -   New indication (Beginning in 1994, Type 6 NDAs were tracked as efficacy supplements) 
     7 -   Drug already marketed, but without an approved NDA 
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APPENDIX 2.C: FDA GLOSSARY OF TERMS FOR DRUGS 
 
 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)   
An Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) contains data that, when submitted to FDA's Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research, Office of Generic Drugs, provides for the review and ultimate approval of a generic drug 
product. Generic drug applications are called "abbreviated" because they are generally not required to include preclinical 
(animal) and clinical (human) data to establish safety and effectiveness.  Instead, a generic applicant must scientifically 
demonstrate that its product is bioequivalent (i.e., performs in the same manner as the innovator drug). Once approved, 
an applicant may manufacture and market the generic drug product to provide a safe, effective, low cost alternative to 
the American public. 
 
Active Ingredient   
An active ingredient is any component that provides pharmacological activity or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or animals. 
 
Biologic License Application (BLA) 
Biological products are approved for marketing under the provisions of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act. The Act 
requires a firm who manufactures a biologic for sale in interstate commerce to hold a license for the product. A biologics 
license application is a submission that contains specific information on the manufacturing processes, chemistry, 
pharmacology, clinical pharmacology and the medical affects of the biologic product. If the information provided meets 
FDA requirements, the application is approved and a license is issued allowing the firm to market the product. 
 
Brand Name Drug 
A brand name drug is a drug marketed under a proprietary, trademark-protected name. 
 
Chemical Type 
The Chemical Type represents the newness of a drug formulation or a new indication for an existing drug 
formulation.  For example, Chemical Type 1 is assigned to an active ingredient that has never before been marketed in 
the United States in any form.  (list of Chemical Types and their meanings). 
 
Company 
The company (also called applicant or sponsor) submits an application to FDA for approval to market a drug product in 
the United States. 
 
Generic Drug 
A generic drug is the same as a brand name drug in dosage, safety, strength, how it is taken, quality, performance, and 
intended use. Before approving a generic drug product, FDA requires many rigorous tests and procedures to assure that 
the generic drug can be substituted for the brand name drug. The FDA bases evaluations of substitutability, or 
"therapeutic equivalence," of generic drugs on scientific evaluations. By law, a generic drug product must contain the 
identical amounts of the same active ingredient(s) as the brand name product. Drug products evaluated as 
"therapeutically equivalent" can be expected to have equal effect and no difference when substituted for the brand name 
product. 
 
New Drug Application (NDA)   
When the sponsor of a new drug believes that enough evidence on the drug's safety and effectiveness has been obtained 
to meet FDA's requirements for marketing approval, the sponsor submits to FDA a new drug application (NDA). The 
application must contain data from specific technical viewpoints for review, including chemistry, pharmacology, medical, 
biopharmaceutics, and statistics. If the NDA is approved, the product may be marketed in the United States.  For 
internal tracking purposes, all NDA's are assigned an NDA number. 
 
New Molecular Entity (NME)   
A New Molecular Entity is an active ingredient that has never before been marketed in the United States in any form.  
 
